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Abstract
In the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the Irish government committed to incorporating the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)
into Ireland’s domestic law. Ireland’s promise to promote human rights is consistent with the Good
Friday Agreement. Although the government agreed to incorporate the ECHR by October 1999,
it has yet to be incorporated because Attorney-General Michael McDowell and Minister of Jus-
tice John O’Donoghue could not decide how to do so. This Note examines the manner in which
Ireland should incorporate the ECHR into Irish domestic law. Part I of this Note discusses back-
ground material related to the ECHR and the Irish Constitution of 1937. Part II evaluates disputed
rights under the ECHR and the Irish Constitution and examines different methods of incorporation.
Finally, Part III recommends constitutional incorporation of the ECHR, and concludes that incor-
poration would increase human rights protection in Ireland and would provide an objective source
of unenumerated rights, subject to judicial review. In the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the
Irish government committed to incorporating the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) into Ireland’s domestic law. Ireland’s promise
to promote human rights is consistent with the Good Friday Agreement. Although the government
agreed to incorporate the ECHR by October 1999, it has yet to be incorporated because Attorney-
General Michael McDowell and Minister of Justice John O’Donoghue could not decide how to
do so. This Note examines the manner in which Ireland should incorporate the ECHR into Irish
domestic law. Part I of this Note discusses background material related to the ECHR and the Irish
Constitution of 1937. Part II evaluates disputed rights under the ECHR and the Irish Constitu-
tion and examines different methods of incorporation. Finally, Part III recommends constitutional
incorporation of the ECHR, and concludes that incorporation would increase human rights protec-
tion in Ireland and would provide an objective source of unenumerated rights, subject to judicial
review.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 1961, Maura Merrick's automobile struck
three-year-old Ide Maire O'Domhnaill.' As a result, Ide sus-
tained severe injuries. 2 Immediately after the accident, Ide's fa-
ther retained a solicitor, who failed to bring an action on Ide's
behalf within three years after the accident.3 Consequently, by
the time Ide's father consulted a different solicitor in 1965, the
statute of limitations, under the Statute of Limitations Act
(1957), had expired.4
In 1972, the Irish judiciary extended the statute of limita-
tions for such claims so that Ide could bring her claim within
three years after the date on which she reached the age of major-
ity. 5 Accordingly, she brought her claim in 1977, two years after
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1. See O'Domhnaill v. Merrick, [1984] I.R. 151, 154 (explaining that defendant's
automobile collided with three-year-old plaintiff). The O'Domhnaill court held that the
plaintiff's claim, brought sixteen years after the car accident, was unfair to the defen-
dant. Id. at 151. The plaintiff, however, brought her claim within the revised statute of
limitations. Id.
2. See id. (explaining that plaintiff suffered very serious personal injuries).
3. See id. at 155 (noting that statute of limitations in force at time of plaintiffs
accident required that plaintiffs solicitor bring action in court within three years after
cause of action arose). In this case, the cause of action was the accident in 1961, yet
Ide's solicitor failed to bring an action on her behalf by 1964. Id.
4. Statute of Limitations, s. 49, sub-5, 2(a)(ii), 1957 (Ir.). See O'Domhnaill, [1984]
I.R. at 155 (describing how plaintiffs second solicitor issued summons in 1965 claiming
damages against Samuel Young, owner of automobile that collided with plaintiff). In
1968, Samuel Young applied to the court for an order dismissing the case for lack of
prosecution. Id. The court granted the order because it deemed the 1965 summons
"out of time." Id.
5. See O'Brien v. Keogh, [1972] I.R. 144, 144-145 (challenging constitutionality of
Statute of Limitations Act, 1957). The O'Brien court held that the Statute of Limitations
Act, 1957 was unconstitutional. Id. Thus, the O'Brien court extended the statute of
limitations under the Limitations Act. The action may be brought at any time before
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she turned twenty-one.6 Although Ide brought her claim before
the statute of limitations expired, the court held that her claim
was unfair to the defendant.7 Ide argued that she deserved a fair
hearing based upon the provisions of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR"). 8 The court, however, rejected her argument on the
grounds that Ireland had not yet incorporated the ECHR into
Irish domestic law.9
In the Good Friday Agreement of 1998,10 the Irish govern-
ment committed to incorporating the ECHR into Ireland's do-
mestic law. 1 Ireland's promise to promote human rights is con-
the expiration of three years from the date the plaintiff ceases to be an infant, which is
the age of twenty-one in Ireland. Id.; see also O'Domhnaill, [1984] I.R. at 155 (discussing
how O'Brien court extended statute of limitations under Statute of Limitations Act,
1957).
6. See O'Domhnaill, [1984] I.R. at 155 (noting that Ide could have brought her
claim until November 29, 1981). Thus, her action fell within the current statute of
limitations. Id.
7. See id. at 159 (holding that although statute of limitations did not bar Ide's
claim, her appeal was dismissed because it was grossly unfair to defendant).
8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm [hereinafter ECHR]; see generally Alpha Connelly,
Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS-A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 34, 46 (Liz Heffernan &James Kingston eds., 1994) (describing
ECHR as highly innovative at time of its creation). The concept of an international
court, empowered to adjudicate individual complaints of human rights violations, was
new to international law. Id.
9. See O'Domhnaill, [1984] I.R. at 159 (noting that ECHR is not part of domestic
law of Ireland and thus lacks binding force in Irish tribunals).
10. See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, at 17-18
[hereinafter Good Friday Agreement] (establishing that Ireland will promote human
rights protection and investigate incorporation of ECHR); Seamus Dunn & Jacqueline
Nolan-Haley, Conflict in Northern Ireland After the Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1372, 1374 (1999) (mentioning that Good Friday Agreement expresses commit-
ment to incorporate ECHR); Paul Mageean & Martin O'Brien, From the Margins to the
Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORBHAM INT'L L.J. 1499,
1520-21 (1999) (noting that Good Friday Agreement refers specifically to incorporation
of ECHR as safeguard of human rights).
11. See Roisin De Rosa, Dublin Government Fails to Meet Obligations Under Good Friday
Agreement, AN PHOBLACHT/REPUBLICAN NEWS, Oct. 5, 1999 (commenting that under
Good Friday Agreement, Dublin government promised to incorporate ECHR so as to
ensure human rights protection throughout Ireland); see also Donncha O'Connell, The
Irish Constitution and the ECHR: Belt and Braces or Blinkers?, IRISH HUM. RTS. REV. 2000 82,
98 (2000) (revealing that United Kingdom is currently in process of incorporating
ECHR). Ireland has not yet initiated a parallel process. Id. Both the Irish and British
governments, however, committed to establishing Human Rights Commissions in Ire-
land and Northern Ireland. Id. The Human Rights Commissions would supervise the
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sistent with the Good Friday Agreement. 12 Although the govern-
ment agreed to incorporate the ECHR by October 1999, it has
yet to be incorporated because Attorney-General Michael Mc-
Dowell and Minister of Justice John O'Donoghue could not de-
cide how to do so."
This Note examines the manner in which Ireland should
incorporate the ECHR into Irish domestic law. Part I of this
Note discusses background material related to the ECHR and
the Irish Constitution of 1937. Part II evaluates disputed rights
under the ECHR and the Irish Constitution and examines differ-
ent methods of incorporation. Finally, Part III recommends
constitutional incorporation of the ECHR, and concludes that
incorporation would increase human rights protection in Ire-
land and would provide an objective source of unenumerated
rights, subject to judicial review.
I. SURVEYING THE LINKS: THE ECHR AND THE
IRISH CONSTITUTION
In 1950, the Council of Europe signed the ECHR. 4 The
ECHR was intended to promote and protect the rights expressed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). 15 Al-
enforcement of Ireland's and Northern Ireland's human rights obligations. Id.; Fion-
nuala Ni Aolain, Legal Developments: The Fortification of a Legal Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1353, 1376-77 (1996) (discussing Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in
Northern Ireland). This Commission funded substantial research on human rights is-
sues. Id.
12. See Good Friday Agreement, supra n.10 (stating commitment to partnership,
equality, and mutual respect as foundation of relationships within Northern Ireland
and between Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland).
13. See De Rosa, supra n.ll (mentioning Ireland's failure to incorporate ECHR as
result of dispute between Attorney-General and Minister of Justice). Indeed, the
United Nations ("U.N.") Human Rights Committee in Geneva reprimanded the Attor-
ney-General for Ireland's failure to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law. Id.
14. See RAYMOND BYRNE & J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, THIE IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM 17.06
(1996) (discussing origin of ECHR); see also Michael O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697, 698 (1980)
(describing ECHR's beginnings); Joseph Jaconelli, The European Convention on Human
Rights as Irish Municipal Law, 22 IRISH JURIST 13, 13 (1987) (mentioning that Ireland
ratified ECHR in 1953).
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt. 1, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
The Preamble to the UDHR provides in pertinent part:
The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights
... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and ... to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance.
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though Ireland signed the ECHR, the Irish government has not
yet incorporated the ECHR into Irish domestic law.16
A. The ECHR
The concept of human rights dates back at least to 1690."7
After World War II, the United Nations General Assembly
("UNGA") adopted the UDHR to promote human rights protec-
tion." UDHR-protected rights include negative rights, such as
prohibiting the government from torturing individuals, and pos-
itive rights, such as requiring the government to ensure every
individual's right to privacy.' 9 The ECHR was designed to en-
Id.; see Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1999) (stating that in
World War II, Allied powers sought respect for human rights); see also BYRNE & MC-
CUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.07 (commenting that many provisions of ECHR reflect
drafters' intention to prevent reoccurrence of human rights abuses seen during World
War I1).
16. See G.F. Whyte, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights Before
the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856, 857 (1982) (commenting that Ireland has
not incorporated ECHR); see also O'Connell, supra n. 11, at 85 (pointing out that Ire-
land has not yet incorporated ECHR); ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSK1, THE EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAw-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 170, 211, 306 (1983)
(noting that Ireland has not incorporated ECHR into Irish domestic law).
17. See EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 1 (Mark W. Janis & Richard S. Kay eds.,
1990) (tracing history of human rights concept back to John Locke's Two Treatises of
Government of 1690); see also Henkin, supra n.15, at 2 (linking modern idea of individual
human rights to John Locke, American Declaration of Independence, and French Dec-
laration of Rights of Man and of Citizen); James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy,
Theology, and Utah Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1515, 1531 (1997) (citing John
Locke's emphasis on individual human rights); James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-
Dudley, A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law Question: A Response to Richard Ep-
stein, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 363, 375 n.65 (2001) (attributing American interest in human
rights toJohn Locke's legacy).
18. See UDHR, supra n.15, at 71. The Preamble provides in pertinent part:
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind ... Now, therefore, the
General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights ...
to the end that every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
... to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.
Id.; see also Henkin, supra n.15, at 2 (stating that during World War II, Allied powers'
goal was to promote respect for human rights); BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at
17.07 (noting that many provisions of ECHR, especially those regarding torture and
forced labor, reflect drafters' intention to prevent future repetitions of Holocaust and
concentration camps of World War II).
19. UDHR, supra n.15, art. 5. Article 5 states: "[nlo one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. Article 12
provides: "Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks [on his privacy, family, home or correspondence]." Id. art. 12; see Tyll van
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sure enforcement of UDHR-protected rights.2
z
1. Background of the ECHR
On November 4, 1950, the Council of Europe met in Rome
to sign the ECHR.2 ' The ECHR entered into force on Septem-
ber 3, 1953.2 At that time, the Council of Europe consisted of
twenty-one Member States.23 After the Cold War, the Council of
Europe's membership expanded to include most of the previous
Soviet bloc States. 24 By June 1999, each of the forty-one Mem-
Geel, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next Century, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 293, 367 (2000) (describing political freedom as negative right); see also Steven W.
Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the
Marketplace, 45 Am. U.L. REV. 1027, 1055-56 (1996) (recognizing freedom from discrimi-
nation as negative right and bilingual education as positive right); Rebecca J. Cook,
Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination, 44 Am. U.L. REV. 975, 992 (1995) (not-
ing that usually, negative rights only require that States refrain from interference with
individuals' privacy, whereas positive rights require States to take steps to protect
human rights).
20. ECHR, supra n.8, Preamble. The Preamble to the ECHR provides in pertinent
part:
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-
minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom
and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the
fights stated in the Universal Declaration ...
Id. (emphasis added); see Liz Heffernan, Introduction to Chapter 2: The European Conven-
tion of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS-A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra n.8, at 31 (not-
ing that Council of Europe created ECHR with intent of enforcing rights under
UDHR).
21. See BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.06 (explaining that Council of
Europe was one of first institutions established after World War II to prevent future
mass violations of human rights). The Council of Europe's first major initiative was the
drafting of the ECHR. Id.; see also O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 697 (describing ECHR as
regional treaty for protection of civil and political rights under Council of Europe's
auspices);Jaconelli, supra n.14, at 13 (noting that Ireland ratified ECHR in 1953). Ad-
ditionally, Ireland granted its citizens the right of individual petition and accepted the
European Court's jurisdiction for an indefinite period of time. Id.
22. See Heffernan, supra n.20, at 31 (mentioning Council of Europe's resolve to
enforce certain UDHR rights); see alsoJanette Amer, Survey of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Its Impact on National and International Institutions, 12 ILSAJ. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 1 (1988) (describing ECHR's purpose as providing protection for individu-
als' civil and political rights under jurisdiction of ECHR State Parties).
23. See Amer, supra n.22, at I n.2 (listing Council of Europe Member States as of
September 1953: Austria, Belgium, Cypnis, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom).
24. See Henkin, supra n.15, at 551 (noting that former Soviet bloc States joined
Council of Europe, thus increasing membership to forty-one States). As of June 1999,
the Council of Europe included the following Member States: Albania, Andorra, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
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bers of the Council of Europe signed the ECHR.25 Until Novem-
ber 1998, the ECHR's regulatory regime consisted of three orga-
nizations: the European Commission of Human Rights26 ("Eu-
ropean Commission"), the European Court 27  ("European
Court"), and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope2" ("Committee of Ministers"). After November 1998, the
European Commission and European Court merged into a sin-
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechten-
stein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Id.
25. See id. (noting when Council of Europe Members signed ECHR).
26. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 700 (explaining European Commission of Human
Rights ("European Commission") procedure). The European Commission conducted
preliminary examination of individual complaints to ensure that complainants ex-
hausted all domestic remedies. Id. The European Commission also determined
whether the complaint was ill-founded or abused the right of petition. Id. Additionally,
the European Commission ascertained whether the complaint was substantially similar
to matters the European Commission had already examined or matters previously sub-
mitted to different international bodies for investigation or settlement. Id. Further-
more, the European Commission determined whether the complaint was anonymous
and whether the complaint was lodged within six months from the date of the final
decision of the domestic tribunal. Id.; see also Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (describing Euro-
pean Commission's first duty as deciding admissibility of complaints). Once the Euro-
pean Commission admitted a complaint, it had to determine the facts by conducting
discovery and attempt to facilitate a settlement between the parties. Id.
27. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 724 (describing how European Court handled cases
only after Commission acknowledged parties' failure to reach settlement). Addition-
ally, the European Court only had jurisdiction over States that have filed a declaration
to this effect with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. Id. The European
Court's jnurisdiction encompassed all cases regarding the interpretation and application
of the ECHR. Id. The European Court's judgments were final. Id. at 727; see also
Amer, supra n.22, at 4 (noting that European Court had power to award damages to
injured plaintiffs).
28. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 46(2). Article 46(2) states: "[t]he final judgment of the
Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its exe-
cution." Id. Article 47 provides:
The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention
and the protocols thereto . . . Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to re-
quest an advisory opinion of the Court shall require a majority vote of the
representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.
Id.; see O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 727 (describing Committee of Ministers as executive deci-
sion-making body of Council of Europe). The Committee of Ministers has the duty of
supervising the execution of European Courtjudgments. Id. at 701. The Committee of
Ministers' power to supervise execution of judgments does not, however, provide for
enforcement sanctions against non-compliant State Parties. Id. Nevertheless, in rare
cases, the Committee of Ministers may suspend or expel the non-compliant State from
the Council of Europe. Id. In addition, a Contracting State may denounce the ECHR,
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gle European Court.29
2. The Operation of The ECHR
Before November 1998, the European Court, European
Commission, and Committee of Ministers worked together to
monitor compliance with the European Court's decisions."' The
European Court accepts complaints from individuals, non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and State Parties who allege
which releases the State from its obligations under the ECHR. Id. Article 58 of the
ECHR states:
A High Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention only after
the expiry of five years from the date on which it became a party to it ... Such
a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting
Party concerned from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any
act which, being capable of constituting a violation of such obligations, may
have been performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became
effective. Any High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a member of the
Council of Europe shall cease to be a Party to this Convention under the same
conditions.
Id.
29. See ECHR, supra n.8, Protocol 11 (effecting merger of European Commission
and European Court in November 1998); Henkin, supra n.15, at 553 (commenting that
although European Commission and European Court merged into single European
Court at Strasbourg in November 1998, understanding their functions provides neces-
sary foundation for studying ECHR's jurisprudence). The merger destroyed neither
the European Commission nor the European Court. Id. at 555-56. Instead, the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Court merged identities to form a single Euro-
pean Court, thus combining the European Commission's quasi-judicial skill of deter-
mining admissibility with the European Court's ability to write reasoned judgments in
both official languages. Id.; see also Amer, supra n.22, at 6 (contending that full-time
European Court would ensure respect for applicants' right to fair trial and access to
courts); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory: The Internet is
Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1023 n.121 (1998) (remarking
that Protocol 11 of ECHR merged European Court and European Commission); see
generally Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery Under the European Convention
on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 145, 145 (1995) (noting that Proto-
col 11 combined European Commission and European Court into one permanent tri-
bunal); Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention
and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH.J. INT'L L. 311, 315 n.15 (2001) (addressing 1998
merger).
30. See Henkin, supra n.15, at 553 (explaining that prior to November 1998, Euro-
pean Commission, European Court, and Committee of Ministers oversaw Contracting
States' observance of European Court judgments). In November 1998, however, the
European Commission and the European Court merged into a single European Court
at Strasbourg in November 1998. Id. Thus, the European Commission's functions were
transferred to the single European Court. Id.; see also Amer, supra n.22, at 2 (describing
European Commission as quasi-judicial body); O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 701 (noting fre-
quency of European Commission meetings prior to November 1998).
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that other State Parties have violated the ECHR.3" The Euro-
pean Court may declare an application inadmissible on various
grounds, including the exhaustion of remedies rule, which re-
quires plaintiffs to exhaust all domestic remedies before apply-
ing to the European Court.32
Prior to November 1998, the European Commission deter-
mined the admissibility of applications. 33 After admitting an ap-
plication, the European Commission gathered facts regarding
the case and facilitated settlements between the parties.3 ' The
European Commission convened five times annually.3 5
a. The Role of the European Commission
Before November 1998, the European Commission met five
times a year for two-week sessions to decide which applications
to admit. 6 After admitting an application, the European Com-
31. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 34. "The Court may receive applications from any per-
son, non-governmental organization ("NGO"), or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the fights set forth in
the Convention or the protocols thereto." Id. Article 33 of the ECHR provides: "Any
High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of
the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party." Id. art.
33; see Connelly, supra n.8, at 36 (describing two methods for filing complaint under
ECHR: as inter-State complaint procedure and individual complaint procedure). Re-
gardless of the route taken, the application is heard in the first instance by the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. Id. State Parties have seldom used the inter-State
complaints procedure and the use of this procedure is not likely to increase. Id. at 46.
No State Party has brought an action against Ireland for breach of the ECHR. Id. at 36.
Most applications to the European Court are individual complaints. Id. at 46; see also
John Gleeson, The European Convention on Human Rights: Its Practical Relevance, 2 IRISHJ.
EUR. L. 248, 249 (1993) (noting that European Court adjudicated only one inter-State
complaint, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. HR, Jan. 18, 1978, Ser. A, No. 25, which
Ireland brought).
32. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 35(1). Article 35(1) states: "[t]he Court may only deal
with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the gen-
erally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the
date on which the final decision was taken." Id.
33. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 708-15 (exploring European Commission's admissi-
bility procedures); see also Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (explaining that European Commis-
sion's first duty was to determine admissibility of applications).
34. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 718 (remarking that European Commission tried to
promote settlements between parties); see also Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (commenting that
after declaring admissibility, European Commission endeavored to facilitate settle-
ments).
35. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 701 (remarking how often European Commission
convened); see also Amer, supra n.22, at 2 (describing European Commission as "part-
time quasi-judicial body").
36. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 701 (revealing frequency of European Commission
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mission had the two-fold duty of gathering facts and securing
settlements between adverse parties 7.3  The European Commis-
sion designated English and French as its official languages."'
As for its composition, the European Commission included
only one national per ECHR State Party.39 The Committee of
Ministers elected European Commission members from a list of
names compiled by the Council of Europe." The ECHR indi-
cated, before November 1998, that European Commission mem-
bers should sit in their individual capacity, but did not explicitly
require any specific qualifications for members.4" The Euro-
pean Commission also elected a President to oversee meetings
and direct the European Commission's work, and two Vice Presi-
dents to overtake these functions if necessary.4 2 The quorum of
the European Commission consisted of ten members.4 3
b. Complaints Under the ECHR
A complaint under the ECHR must allege the violation of
an ECHR-protected right arising from an ECHR State Party's ac-
tion or inaction.4 4 ECHR-protected rights include basic human
meetings); see also Amer, supra n.22, at 2 (explaining that European Commission's gen-
eral functions approximated judicial duties).
37. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 718 (explaining that European Commission sought
to secure friendly settlements); see also Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (mentioning that Euro-
pean Commission strived to achieve settlements).
38. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 702 (noting that European Commission would
sometimes handle applications in other languages as well).
39. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 701-02 (describing limitation on representation of
nationals from same State in European Commission). In practice, national delegations
to the Assembly provided lists of their recommended candidates, including at least two
nationals. /d. at 702.
40. See id. at 702 (noting that Committee of Ministers elected European Commis-
sion members by absolute majority of votes every six years).
41. See id. (interpreting ECHR's stance toward Commission member qualifica-
tions). The President of the Assembly suggested to national delegations that their can-
didates should manifest integrity, competence in human rights matters, and significant
legal or judicial experience. Id.
42. See id. (describing President's function as presiding at meetings and directing
Commission's work). If the President can no longer execute these duties, either Vice
President may assume these duties. Id.
43. See id. (revealing European Commission's ten-member quorum). However,
seven members sufficed to declare an application inadmissible or remove it from the
list of cases. Id. Additionally, seven members sufficed to decide whether to describe an
application to an ECHR State Party, such as Ireland, in order to discuss the applica-
tion's admissibility with the Irish government or to obtain relevant information from
the Irish government. Id.
44. See Amer, supra n.22, at 2 (explaining that applicants to European Court are
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rights,4 5 rights to fair civil or criminal trials,4 6 family/privacy
rights, 47 political rights, 48 and social rights.4" With several excep-
required to allege that Contracting State committed act or failed to commit act in viola-
tion of ECHR human rights provisions).
45. ECHR, supra n.8, arts. 2-5. The ECHR provides in Articles 2-5:
Article 2: Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
Article 3: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. No, one shall be re-
quired to perform forced or compulsory labor.
Article 5: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
Id.
46. Id. arts. 6-7, Fourth Protocol, art. 2. The ECHR provides in Articles 6-7 &
Fourth Protocol, art. 2:
Article 6: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law.
Article 7: No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national
or intentional law at the time when it was committed.
Fourth Protocol, art. 2: Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own.
Id.
47. Id. arts. 8, 12. The ECHR provides in Articles 8 and 12:
Article 8: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home, and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 12: Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right.
Id.
48. Id. arts. 9-11, First Protocol, art. 3. The ECHR provides in Articles 9-11 and
First Protocol, Article 3:
Article 9: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Article 10: Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
Article 11: Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
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tions, ° ECHR State Parties may derogate from ECHR Articles in
times of war or other public emergencies.5 1
c. Inadmissibility
The European Court will only accept an application within
six months of the date of the domestic court's final decision.52
The European Court may declare an application inadmissible
based on several factors." These include situations where the
applicant's domestic remedies are not exhausted; 54 more than
six months elapsed since the final judgment of the applicant's
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his interests.
First Protocol, Article 3: The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature.
Id.
49. Id. First Protocol, art. 2. The ECHR provides in First Protocol, Article 2:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any func-
tions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in con-
formity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
Id.
50. See ECHR, supra n.8, art. 2 (protecting right to life); see also id. art. 3 (prohibit-
ing torture), art. 4 (forbidding slavery), art. 7 (preventing punishment without law);
O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 699 (noting that State Parties are not permitted to derogate
from right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, or freedom from ex post
facto criminal laws). Additionally, Article 18 of the ECHR requires that derogations
permitted under the ECHR shall not be applied for any purpose other than protecting
State interest. Id.
51. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 15. Article 15 provides:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation,
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obli-
gations under international law.
Id.; see O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 699 (describing derogation as limitation of certain rights
when required to protect State interest, such as national security or public health); see
also Connelly, supra n.8, at 37 (stating that Article 15 of ECHR permits States to dero-
gate from some of its ECHR obligations in "times of public emergency threatening the
life of a nation, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation").
52. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 35(1). Article 35(1) provides: "[t]he Court may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the
generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months from
the date on which the final decision was taken." Id.
53. See generally id. art. 35 (containing admissibility criteria).
54. Id. art. 35(1).
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domestic tribunal; 55 an applicant submitted a complaint anony-
mously;56 an application conveyed no new information and sub-
stantially duplicated a matter that the European Court had previ-
ously adjudicated or released to another procedure, settlement,
or transnational investigation; 57 an application was manifestly ill-
founded;" an applicant abused the right of petition;59 or an ap-
plication addressed events that preceded the ECHR's entry into
force, unless the events constitute a continuing breach of the
ECHR.6°
Under the ECHR, the exhaustion of remedies rule applies
to both individual and inter-State applications. 6 Accordingly,
the individual must prove that she has exhausted each available
remedy. In the absence of proof, the European Court will ex-
amine the issue.6 2 The European Court requires that the appli-
cant exhaust only the specific remedies that have the power to
provide redress for her complaint.63 Also, the European Court
55. See id. art. 35(1) (containing six months rule).
56. See id. art. 35(2) (a) (providing that European Court "shall not deal with any
application submitted under Article 34 that is anonymous").
57. Id. art. 35(2)(b). Article 35(2)(b) provides: "[t]he Court shall not deal with
any application submitted under Article 34 that is... substantially the same as a matter
that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another
procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new
information." Id.
58. Id. art. 35(3). Article 35(3) provides: "[t]he Court shall declare inadmissible
any individual application submitted under Article 34 which it considers incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded,
or an abuse of the right of application." Id.; see Patrick Dillon-Malone, Individual Reme-
dies and the Strasbourg System in an Irish Context, in HUMAN RIGHTs-A EUROPEAN PERSPEC-
TIVE, 48, 61 (Liz Heffernan & James Kingston eds., 1994) (indicating that Commission
will reject complaints as manifestly ill-founded when no prima facie case exists).
59. See ECHR, supra n.8, art. 35(1) (stating exhaustion of remedies rule).
60. See id. art. 35(1) (containing exhaustion of remedies rule); see also O'Boyle,
supra n.14, at 711 (explaining that ECHR does not have retroactive power).
61. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 712 (noting that State Parties are permitted to waive
exhaustion of remedies rule).
62. See id. at 713 (stating that applicant must prove that she has exhausted State
remedy or that State remedy does not provide adequate relief). When the accused
State argues that the applicant has not exhausted all existent remedies, the State bears
the burden of proving its claim. Id. If the State proves that an untried remedy exists,
the applicant must then demonstrate that she exhausted the remedy or that it was inad-
equate. Id.; see generally Vincent P. Pace, Partial Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: The Cana-
dian Model Offers a Viable Solution to the United Kingdom's Bill of Rights Debate, 13 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 149, 157 (1998) (mentioning exhaustion of remedies).
63. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 712-13 (detailing Court's approach to exhaustion of
remedies); see, e.g., Belgian Vagrancy Cases (1971), Y.B. EUR. CON. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
788 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights),Judgment of June 18, 1971, Ser. A at 29 (holding
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does not view an applicant's petition to the Queen of England as
an effective remedy, since these petitions are measures of
grace. 64 One commentator noted that the effectiveness or ade-
quacy of a remedy usually depends upon the particular facts
stated in the complaint. 65
Furthermore, a complainant must raise the same substan-
tive complaint before the European Court that she raised before
the domestic court.66 The European Court, however, does not
limit its definition of remedies to courtroom recovery.67 Finally,
under the six months rule, the limitations period is initiated
upon the European Court's receipt of the applicant's first com-
munication establishing the application's purpose.68
d. Adjudication Under the ECHR
Experts explain that, on average, the European Court takes
six years to decide an application.69 After admitting an applica-
tion alleging a violation of the ECHR, the European Court has
the two-fold duty of evaluating the facts and facilitating an ami-
cable settlement between the parties.7" The European Court
may dispense free legal aid from the Council of Europe's gen-
that applicants were not required to exhaust remedy that would not have provided re-
dress for applicants' complaint, according to legal precedent in Belgium).
64. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 713 (noting remedies that applicant need not ex-
haust). The phrase "measures of grace" refers to the Queen's discretionary power to
grant or deny an applicant's petition. Id.
65. See id. at 714 (explaining that remedy may be considered ineffective if activity
complained of could not be challenged successfully in court). Additionally, a remedy
may be considered ineffective because of a lengthy delay or because it is inaccessible.
Id.; see also Dillon-Malone, sunra n.58, at 51 (noting that what constitutes effective rem-
edy varies according to substantive right being invoked). Generally, an applicant has
no right to compensation for an adjudicated breach of her rights under the ECHR. Id.
66. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 714 (describing substantial similarity requirement).
67. See id. (elucidating European Court's definition of remedies). For example, if
a prisoner is awarded review of lower prison authorities' acts and decisions, the Euro-
pean Court would hold that the prisoner had received a remedy. Id.
68. See id. at 705 (conveying how to calculate limitations period).
69. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 59 (explaining how average six-year delays in
Strasbourg system often render European Court's decisions moot); see also Amer, supra
n.22, at 6 (discussing criticism of five and six-year delays at European Court); Heifer-
nan, supra n.20, at 32 (opining that delays commonly exceeding five years would dis-
suade most applicants); O'Boyle, supra n. 14, at 732 (describing European Court's pro-
cedures as cumbersome and creating delay).
70. See Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (describing European Court's functions after admit-
ting 'applications).
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eral funds in conjunction with any case's representation."' In
addition to determination of the facts, the European Court is
also authorized to encourage friendly settlement of disputes.72
The European Court consists of a number of judges equal
to the number of Contracting Parties; the Parliamentary Assem-
bly chooses the candidates for European Court judgeships from
a list of three candidates nominated by each Contracting Party
and elects the judges by a simple majority of votes. 73 To ascer-
71. See id. (noting that European Commission could grant free legal aid to appli-
cants). This legal aid scheme is an important innovation of the ECHR. Id. After the
European Commission and the European Court merged into a single European Court
in November 1998, the European Court assumed the function of granting free legal aid
to applicants. Id. See generally Margot Penfield Schoenborn, The Access to Justice Bill and
Human Rights Act of 1998: Britain's Legislative Overhaul Leaves the System Scrambling to
Mend the Safety Net, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 183, 185-86, 190-91 (2000) (exploring
legal aid in context of ECHR); David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention
on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243,
253-54 (1993) (examining legal aid vis-d-vis ECHR).
72. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 718 (discussing attempts at settlement). The small
number of cases that reach settlement does not accurately convey the importance of
conciliation under the ECHR. Id. at 719. One reason that few cases reach settlement is
that parties sometimes make unofficial arrangements that lead applicants to withdraw
their applications. Id.; see also Dillon-Malone, supra n. 58, at 58 (claiming that impor-
tance of settlement under ECHR cannot be overstated). For the European Court,
resolving a dispute by settlement is often the most effective and fastest way to guarantee
that State Parties will alter their offending laws and administrative practices. Id. See
generally Roberta M. Harding, In the Belly of the Beast: a Comparison of the Evolution and
Status of Prisoners' Rights in the United States and Europe, 27 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1, 24
(1998) (mentioning friendly settlement in context of ECHR); Pace, supra n.62, at 157-
58 (addressing settlement under ECHR); Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the
European Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, 951 (1997)
(alluding to topic of settlement under ECHR).
73. ECHR, supra n.8, arts. 20-22. The ECHR provides in Articles 20-22:
Article 20: Number ofjudges. The Court shall consist of a number ofjudges
equal to that of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 21: Criteria for office. 1. The judges shall be of high moral character
and must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high
judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized competence. 2. The judges
shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity. 3. During their term of
office the judges shall not engage in any activity which is incompatible with
their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office; all
questions arising from the application of this paragraph shall be decided by
the Court.
Article 22: Election of judges. 1. The judges shall be elected by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly with respect to each High Contracting Party by a majority of
votes cast from a list of three candidates nominated by the High Contracting
Party. 2. The same procedure shall be followed to complete the Court in the
event of the accession of new High Contracting Parties and in filling casual
vacancies.
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tain the facts of the case, the European Court conducts an oral
hearing where no formal evidentiary rules apply."4 Indeed, the
European Court lacks set rules of evidence. 5 At these hearings,
the European Court typically admits all relevant evidence.76
Commentators explain that although the European Court
officially begins establishing facts after formally admitting an ap-
plication, the European Court often starts gathering and verify-
ing facts immediately after receiving the applicant's first letter of
complaint.77 During this process, the European Court is permit-
ted to gather affidavits and official documents, hear expert wit-
nesses and the statements of both parties' observations, and send
delegations to the States involved in the case in order to investi-
gate the situation and question the parties.78 Although the Euro-
pean Court has occasionally sent delegations during individual
applications, particularly those related to treatment in prison,
the European Court generally only employs investigative delega-
tions while trying inter-State cases." At least one commentator
notes that the ECHR does not give the European Court the
power to compel document production or witnesses' attend-
ance.
8 0
If the parties are able to agree, the European Court must
establish that the terms of the settlement take into account the
Id.
74. See Amer, supra n.22, at 3 (mentioning that European Commission usually ad-
mitted all relevant evidence at oral hearing).
75. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 717 (noting that European Court lacks codified
rules addressing problems of burden of proof, illegally acquired evidence, privileged
documents, and perjury).
76. See id. (describing European Court's admission of evidence after receiving ap-
plicant's first letter of complaint).
77. See id. at 715 (explaining that process of gathering and verifying facts may in-
volve reviewing affidavits and official documents, hearing expert witnesses, investiga-
tions by European Commission delegations, and questioning of parties during hear-
ings).
78. See id. (providing further details of discovery). Because the European Court
lacks pre-established rules of evidence, the European Court takes a flexible approach to
the problems of illegally acquired evidence, privileged documents, perjury, and burden
of proof. Id. at 717.
79. See id. at 716 (noting when European Court uses its powers of investigation); see
also Amer, supra n.22, at 4 (noting that European Court also possesses limited power to
give advisory opinions on legal questions regarding ECHR and its Protocols).
80. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 717 (revealing limitations regarding European
Court's discovery power). The European Commission, however, noted that plaintiff
must prove her allegations beyond a reasonable doubt-a doubt based on the facts
presented. Id.
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parties' human rights."' Commentators, therefore, opine that
when an individual alleges violations regarding an administrative
practice or legislative act that affects numerous individuals, the
European Court will recommend altering the law or practice. 2
At least one scholar asserts that typically, in a settlement, a com-
plainant secures an alteration in the law and receives compensa-
tion in exchange for withdrawal of her complaint and an agree-
ment not to initiate future lawsuits before national or interna-
tional courts.8 3 The same commentator further notes that the
European Court's attention to society's interest upholds ECHR
rights and also encourages parties to settle, thus curtailing dis-
putes." If the European Court successfully facilitates a settle-
ment, the European Court will remove the case from its docket
and issue a brief statement of the facts and the solution
reached. 5
Experts recognize that the ECHR does not establish any
method of ensuring the implementation of ECHR provisions or
the enforcement of ECHR decisions within the Contracting
States' domestic law.86 Consequently, the European Court's de-
81. See id. at 718 (explaining that settlements must address parties' human rights).
Experts opine that the European Commission's belief that settlements must serve the
State Parties' interest maintained the integrity of ECHR rights and gave State Parties an
incentive to reach settlement, rather than engaging in prolonged disputes. Id. at 718-
19; see also Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 59 (adding that when settlements do not pro-
pose amendment or removal of offending law, European Court may refuse to remove
case from its docket). In practice, the European Court has never carried out this
threat. Id.
82. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 718-19 (illustrating how European Court attempts to
serve society's interest through resolution of disputes).
83. See id. (noting usual settlement results); see also Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at
59 (explaining that after European Court approves of friendly settlements, Committee
of Ministers has duty of supervising execution of settlement terms). In practice, super-
vising friendly settlements is unnecessary because the State Party would not agree to
terms that the State did not wish to implement. Id.
84. See O'Boyle, supra n.14, at 718-19 (cataloguing effects of European Court's at-
tention to society's interest). Before November 1998, the European Commission acted
as an intermediary between the parties. Id. at 719. The European Commission told the
parties whether or not the proposed settlement would promote the general interest. Id.
85. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 39. Article 39 states: "[i]f a friendly settlement is ef-
fected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by means of a decision which shall be
confined to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached." Id.
86. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 50 (concluding that ECHR does not provide
system of implementation or enforcement of European Court decisions by States Par-
ties); see also BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.24 (remarking that international
agreements to which State is party do not operate at domestic level unless they are
incorporated); Doina Micu, The Practice of the Constitutional Court of Romania as Compared
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cisions are not binding on Irish courts.87 Scholars note that a
generally recognized principle of international law holds that
States must uphold their obligations under all international
agreements.88 At least one expert explains that accordingly, the
European Court's finding of a violation creates only obligations
of result, which means that the respondent State has the sole
responsibility to discontinue the wrongful act, make reparations
for damages, and prevent the violation's recurrence.89
e. Enforcing the ECHR
The European Court does not have the authority to enforce
its judgments.9° Additionally, Irish domestic courts have no duty
to follow European Courtjudgments as binding precedent.9 1 In-
deed, Article 46 of the ECHR, entitled "Binding Force and Exe-
cution of Judgments," provides only that the Contracting States
with the Practice of the European Court for Human Rights, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 781, 785
(1999) (commenting on unenforceability); Schoenborn, supra n.71, at 190-91 (noting
that ECHR is unenforceable in Britain until it is incorporated).
87. See BYRNE & MCCuTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.18 (noting that European Court
decisions do not bind Irish courts or other domestic courts that have not incorporated
ECHR); see also Gleeson, supra n.31, at 249 (explaining that ECHR gives Contracting
States discretion regarding implementation of European Court judgments).
88. IR. CONST. art. 29.3. Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution states: "Ireland ac-
cepts the generally recognized principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its
relations with other States." Id.; see Charles Lysaght, The Status of International Agreements
in Irish Domestic Law, 12 IRISH L. TIMES 171 (1994) (explaining States Parties' obligation
to comply with international agreements under customary international law); see also
Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 50 (noting that in accordance with customary interna-
tional law, European Court's finding of violation of ECHR gives State Parties responsi-
bility to enforce decision).
89. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 50 (noting inconsistency between obligations
of result, which State has sole responsibility of upholding and may neglect, and ECHR's
Article 13 promise of effective remedies before domestic authorities).
90. See Amer, supra n.22, at 2 (explaining that European Court relies primarily on
voluntary compliance of Member States with European Court judgments); see also
BYRNE & MCCuTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.15 (noting that ECHR creates obligations be-
tween States Parties, but does not confer enforceable legal rights on Irish citizens until
Ireland incorporates ECHR into Irish domestic law); Micu, supra n. 86, at 785 (recog-
nizing that ECHR decisions are not enforceable without incorporation); Schoenborn,
supra n.71, at 190-91 (commenting that until incorporation process is complete, ECHR
is unenforceable in British domestic courts).
91. See Gleeson, supra n.31, at 265 (mentioning domestic courts' lack of obligation
to accord precedential value to ECHR judgments); see also Micu, supra n.86, at 785
(explaining that enforcement of ECHR rulings depends on each State); BYRNE & Mc-
CUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.10 (noting that European Court decisions are not binding
on Irish tribunals); see e.g., Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. 36, 66 (declaring that
ECHR decisions have no effect on Irish law).
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should abide by the European Court's final judgment in cases
where the States are parties.92 Such judgments bind the Con-
tracting States that were parties to the action only insofar as the
Committee of Ministers can punish a Contracting State for non-
compliance.93 Consequently, experts agree that ECHR judg-
ments have little impact on domestic case law.9 4
B. Human Rights Law in Ireland
The Irish government ratified the ECHR on February 25,
1953, and decided concurrently to grant to its nationals the right
of individual petition to the European Court and to accept the
jurisdiction of the European Court.95 Scholars note, however,
that the Irish government considered Articles 40 through 44 of
92. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 46. Article 46 states: "1. The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers, which shall supervise its execution." Id.
93. See Amer, supra n.22, at 5 (describing Committee of Ministers' possible sanc-
tions). In extreme cases, the Committee of Ministers may suspend or expel the offend-
ing State from the Council of Europe. Id.
94. See id. (noting ECHRjudgments' lack of influence on domestic plane); see also
Lysaght, supra n.88, at 171 (explaining that Irish courts cannot enforce ECHR provi-
sions until Ireland incorporates ECHR into Irish domestic law, although Irish courts
occasionally consider ECHR provisions regarding freedom of expression in determin-
ing scope of right to freedom of expression under Irish Constitution); Whyte, supra
n.16, at 860-61 (stating that Ireland has failed to incorporate ECHR into Irish domestic
law and consequently Irish courts do not have to apply ECHR provisions in domestic
cases). Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution, which states that "Ireland accepts the gen-
erally recognized principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations
with other States," may support the proposition that the ECHR is part of domestic Irish
law. IR. CONST. art. 29.3; Whyte, supra n.16, at 858. This argument fails, however, be-
cause the Irish judiciary has traditionally construed Article 29.3 as applying solely to
inter-State relations and not conferring rights on individuals, since the language of Arti-
cle 29.3 does not refer to "citizens," "persons," or "individuals." Whyte, supra n.16, at
859; O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 82 (commenting that ECHR provisions and European
Court decisions do not bind domestic courts, though Irish judges sometimes invoke
ECHR provisions to support their decisions regarding Irish law); BYRNE & MCCUTCH-
EON, supra n.14, at 17.10 (explaining that international treaties are unenforceable in
State Parties' domestic courts). Additionally, although States Parties are not obligated
to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court, Ireland has accepted the jurisdiction
of the European Court. Id.; Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 48 (noting that ECHR does
not compel States Parties' domestic courts to enforce ECHR provisions or European
Court decisions).
95. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 13 (explaining that Ireland demonstrated commit-
ment to ECHR by granting Irish citizens right of petition and accepting jurisdiction of
Court indefinitely). Ireland has not yet incorporated the ECHR, unlike most of the
other Members of the Council of Europe. Id.; DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, 170-75 (com-
menting that most other Members of Council of Europe have incorporated ECHR).
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the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, which address fundamental
rights, to sufficiently protect the rights of Irish nationals.96 Be-
cause Articles 40 through 44 of the Irish Constitution do not
exhaustively enumerate the human rights of Irish citizens, the
Irish judiciary interprets Article 40.3 of the Irish Constitution,
rather than the ECHR, as a source of unenumerated rights. 9 7
Experts agree that the Irish Constitution prevents automatic in-
corporation of the ECHR into Irish domestic law.98
1. The ECHR in Ireland
On November 4, 1950, the Irish Minister for External Af-
fairs signed the ECHR with the other Members of the Council of
Europe.9 9 Upon becoming a party to the ECHR, Ireland en-
96. IR. CONST. arts. 40-44; see DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, at 170 (explaining Ire-
land's motive for not incorporating ECHR upon ratification).
97. See Anthony Tyler Barnes, Ireland's Divorce Bill: Traditional Irish and International
Norms of Equality and Bodily Integrity at Issue in a Domestic Abuse Context, 31 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 643, 657 (1998) (noting that Irish judiciary construed Article 40.3 of the Irish
Constitution as proclamation to Irish Parliament [hereinafter Oireachtas] that estab-
lished no criteria for judicial review). Later, the Irish courts construed Article 40.3 as a
source of unenumerated or "unspecified" rights. Id.; see also Ann Sherlock, Constitu-
tional Change, Referenda and the Courts in Ireland, PUB. L. 125, 128 (Spring 1997) (mark-
ing year when Irish courts' attitude toward judicial review changed dramatically); see
e.g., Ryan v. Attorney-General [1965] I.R. 294, 312-13 (finding protection for
unenumerated rights under Article 40 of Irish Constitution). But see G.W. Hogan,
Unenumerated Personal Rights: Ryan's Case Re-evaluated, 25-27 IRISH JURIST 95, 101 (1990-
92) (explaining how Irish courts did not specify objective means of identifying the
unenumerated rights to which Article 40.3.1 refers).
98. IR. CONST. art 29.6. Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution provides: "[n]o inter-
national agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be deter-
mined by the Oireachtas." Id.; see O'Connell, supra n.l, at 85 (criticizing Art. 29.6 of
Irish Constitution as impediment to domestic enforcement of ECHR). Under the dual-
ist approach espoused in Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution, the Oireachtas must take
active steps, such as legislation, to incorporate the ECHR into Irish domestic law. Id.;
see also Jaconelli, supra n.14, at 17 (explaining that Article 29.6 of Irish Constitution
does not allow for automatic incorporation of ECHR); Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 48
(noting that Article 29.6 of Irish Constitution embodies dualist approach to interna-
tional treaties; consequently, without legislation incorporating ECHR provisions, Irish
courts have refused to enforce ECHR provisions, particularly as against conflicting Irish
law); Lysaght, supra n.88, at 171 (stating that Article 29.6 of Irish Constitution adopts
dualist approach to incorporation, whereby international agreements are not automati-
cally incorporated); BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.17 (concluding that Irish
constitutional jurisprudence embraces dualist approach to international law, and there-
fore international agreements are not automatically incorporated into Irish domestic
legal order).
99. See O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 83 (stating when Ireland signed ECHR). Inciden-
tally, when Ireland signed the ECHR, the Irish government was trying to prevent the
partition of Ireland into Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Id.
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tered a reservation explaining that it interpreted Article 6(3) (c)
of the ECHR 0 as not requiring the provision of civil legal aid to
any greater extent than Ireland already provided at the time. ° !
Subsequently, Ireland ratified all of the protocols to the ECHR,
except the Seventh.' 0 2 Commentators note that despite these ac-
tions, Ireland has not yet incorporated the ECHR into its domes-
tic law. 1 13
Scholars agree that Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution for-
mulates a dualistic approach to international treaties, which
mandates that the Irish Parliament (the "Oireachtas") must take
steps to incorporate such treaties into domestic law. 0 4 Thus, in-
ternational law does not automatically enter the Irish legal or-
der, and consequently, international treaties do not create obli-
gations or rights presentable to an Irish court unless they are
successfully incorporated into Irish domestic law."0 In addition,
100. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 6(3)(c). Article 6(3)(c) states: "[e]veryone charged
with a criminal offense has the following minimum rights: ... to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means
to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require."
Id.
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 185 (Brice Dickson ed.,
1997) (noting Ireland's reservation to Art. 6 of ECHR).
102. See ECHR, supra n.8, Seventh Protocol (mandating procedural safeguards re-
lating to expulsion of aliens, right of appeal in criminal cases, compensation for wrong-
ful conviction, freedom from double jeopardy, and equality between spouses); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra n.101, at 185 (commenting that
Ireland has ratified all protocols to ECHR, except for Seventh Protocol).
103. See Whyte, supra n.16, at 857 (explaining that Ireland has not incorporated
ECHR); see also O'Connell, supra n.l, at 85 (noting that Ireland has not yet incorpo-
rated ECHR); DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, at 211, 306 (mentioning that Ireland has not
incorporated ECHR).
104. IR. CONST. art. 29.6 (stating that Oireachtas alone may incorporate interna-
tional agreements).
105. See Leo Flynn, Ireland, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 183 (C.A. Gearty ed., 1997) (exploring
ramifications of dualist approach to international law). Ireland has given force to inter-
national agreements as domestic law in several ways. Id. For example, when Ireland
acceded to the European Communities ("EC"), Ireland amended the Irish Constitution
so that EC law would have supremacy over the Irish Constitution. Id. Article 29.4.3 of
the Irish Constitution states:
No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or mea-
sures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of mem-
bership of the European Union ("EU") or the Communities, or prevents laws
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the EU or the Communities or by
institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the Treaties establishing
the Communities, from having force of law in the State.
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Article 15.2 provides that only the Oireachtas may incorporate
international agreements into Irish domestic law, via Irish do-
mestic legislation. 10 6 Conversely, countries such as the Nether-
lands adopt a monist approach, under which international
agreements to which a State is a party immediately become part
of domestic law.10 7
In accordance with the Irish Constitution, the Irish judicial
system consists of twenty-three District Courts that handle most
trials of minor matters (e.g., landlord-tenant disputes), civil or
criminal; nine Circuit Courts that handle more serious cases and
District Court appeals; a High Court that has unrestricted civil
and criminal jurisdiction, as well as original jurisdiction over
cases involving constitutional challenges of laws; and a Supreme
Court that exercises appellate jurisdiction over all High Court
judgments."0 8 Commentators agree that since 1965, the Irish
courts have exercised more vigorous judicial review of legisla-
tion. 1°9 Scholars note that by using the power ofjudicial review,
106. IR. CONST. art. 15.2. Article 15.2 of the Irish Constitution provides: "[t]he
sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas:
no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State." Id.; see O'Connell,
supra n.10, at 85 (explaining that under Article 15.2, if Oireachtas does not incorporate
ECHR via Irish domestic legislation, ECHR will remain unincorporated and unenforce-
able in Ireland); see also BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.15 (concluding that
Irish courts cannot enforce ECHR provisions as part of domestic Irish law unless ECHR
is incorporated into Irish domestic law by Oireachtas).
107. See Report of the Constitution Review Group (May 1996), available at http://pages.
zoom.co.uk/david-surridge/ConstRevGrpArt40-44.htm (describing Netherlands as
monist nation). The United Kingdom and Sweden have a dualist tradition. Id.; see also
Lysaght, supra n.88, at 171 (contrasting monist and dualist approaches to incorpora-
tion). Britain is a proponent of the dualist approach to incorporation, which means
that all international treaties, agreements, and conventions to which Britain is a party
do not automatically become part of British law. Id.; see generally Andrew L. Strauss,
"Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?": Where America Ends and the
International Order Begins, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237, 1265 (1998) (mentioning American
dualist approach).
108. See IR. CONST. art. 34 (establishing framework of Irish judiciary); see also Fran-
cis William O'Brien, Judicial Review in Ireland, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 587, 589
(1990) (describing Irish judicial system). When the High Court acts as a trial court, it
sits with one judge plus ajury in criminal cases, because Article 38.6 of the Irish Consti-
tution requires ajury for civilians in all criminal cases. Id. When the High Court acts as
an appellate court, it usually sits with three judges. Id.
109. See O'Brien, supra n.108, at 588-89 (explaining that Irish courts exercised ju-
dicial review especially from 1965 onward); see, e.g., Ryan v. Attorney-General, [1965]
I.R. 294 (exercising judicial review to find constitutionality of statute); see generally Nor-
ris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. 36 (using judicial review to uphold constitutionality
of statute); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (formulating concept of judicial
review in United States).
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Irish courts chose to give precedence to domestic law over con-
flicting provisions of the ECHR." °
For example, in re 0 Laighleis,"' the applicant claimed that
his internment violated his right to liberty under Article 5 of the
ECHR and his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR." 2
In response to plaintiff 0 Laighleis' claim, the High Court cited
Articles 29.6 and 15.2 of the Irish Constitution to show that the
ECHR had not automatically become part of Irish law."l Next,
the High Court reasoned that the ECHR could not affect or
qualify Irish legislation.' 14 Accordingly, the High Court held
that in the case of an irreconcilable conflict between an Irish
statute and an international treaty, the domestic courts must give
precedence to the Irish statute.' 15
Consequently, commentators agree that the Irish courts sel-
dom interpret ECHR provisions or accept arguments based on
ECHR provisions. 1 6  Scholars further agree that Irish rights
110. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 48 (explaining that Irish courts consistently
refused to enforce ECHR provisions against conflicting Irish domestic legislation).
Consequently, the Irish tribunals seldom interpret, or listen to in-court arguments
based on, the scope and meaning of ECHR provisions. Id; see also Whyte, supra n.16, at
860-61 (noting that Irish courts have declined to take cognizance of ECHR provisions in
domestic cases).
111. Re 0 Laighleis, [1960] I.R. 93 (holding that ECHR was irrelevant to validity of
Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940 because supremacy of Irish domestic
legislation is not displaced by unincorporated ECHR); see O'Connell, supra n.1, at 86
(referring to this holding as 0 Laighleis principle).
112. Re O Laighleis, supra n.111, at 122-23 (alleging violations of Articles 5 and 6 of
ECHR); see also BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.17 (noting that 0 Laighleis was
interned under Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940, which Irish Su-
preme Court upheld against prior challenge under Article 26 of ECHR).
113. See BVRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.17 (deducing that ECHR is not
part of Irish law); see also O'Connell, supra n.11, at 85 (explaining that despite Ireland's
relatively unqualified ratification of ECHR in 1953, ECHR lacks force of law in domestic
legal proceedings because of Articles 15.2 and 29.6 of Irish Constitution). These Arti-
cles declare, respectively, that the Oireachtas has exclusive power to make Irish law and
incorporate international agreements into domestic law. Id.; Whyte, supra n.16, at 857
(stating that 0 Laighleis court relied on Article 29.6 of Irish Constitution for proposition
that ECHR is not part of Irish law).
114. See BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.17 (revealing ECHR's lack of
effect on Irish law); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 47 (concluding that ECHR has less
power to protect human rights than domestic courts). Although Ireland displayed re-
luctance in implementing ECHR standards, the Irish Government never considered
withdrawing from the ECHR. Id.
115. See re 0 Laighleis, supra n.111, at 124-25 (holding that Irish domestic legisla-
tion has supremacy over ECHR because Oireachtas has not incorporated ECHR).
116. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 48 (noting that Irish courts rarely interpret,
or hear arguments relating to, ECHR provisions); see also BYRNE & McCUTCHEON, supra
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claimants cannot rely on European Court judgments in domestic
legal proceedings. 17 As a result, commentators note that the
Irish judiciary excluded itself from the ongoing dialogue con-
cerning human rights between European courts and the Euro-
pean Court. l I' This dialogue elaborated upon and expanded
ECHR-based human rights with respect to changing circum-
stances since the signing of the ECHR in 1950, thus giving the
ECHR the status of an evolving constitutional instrument in Eu-
ropean human rights jurisprudence. 19
2. Fundamental Human Rights Under The Irish Constitution
Scholars agree that the Irish government considered Arti-
cles 40 through 44 of the Irish Constitution, which address fun-
damental rights, to sufficiently guard the fundamental human
rights of Irish citizens."' Article 40 classifies personal rights as a
category of fundamental rights. 1 ' Specifically, Article 40.1 re-
quires that all citizens be held equal before the law.'22 Addition-
ally, Article 40.3.1 of the Irish Constitution contains the State's
guarantee to defend and vindicate the personal rights of Irish
n.14, 17.15 (concluding that Irish courts refuse to recognize ECHR provisions as con-
ferring rights in Irish tribunals and will continue to do so until Oireachtas incorporates
ECHR).
117. See Whyte, supra n.16, at 858 (mentioning Irish citizens' inability to depend
on European Court decisions in domestic tribunals). This commentator opines that,
since Ireland has accepted European Court's jurisdiction and granted right of individ-
ual petition under ECHR to Irish citizens, Ireland should enable Irish citizens to rely on
ECHR in domestic proceedings. Id.; see also O'Connell, supra n.] 1, at 85 (stating that
ECHR lacks force of domestic law in domestic lawsuits and noting that various cases
have upheld this view); BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at 17.16 (explaining that
Irish citizens cannot rely on ECHR provisions in domestic courts, that lawyers have
invoked ECHR provisions in in-court arguments, and that Irish courts have uniformly
rejected ECHR-based arguments); DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, at 172 (stating that be-
cause Oireachtas has not incorporated ECHR in legislation, ECHR has no legal value as
against Irish law); Report of Constitution Review Group, supra n.107 (remarking that incor-
poration would allow rights claimants to rely on ECHR provisions in Irish tribunals).
118. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 48-49 (noting Ireland's absence from dia-
logue between European national courts and European Court). Over time, this dia-
logue has endowed the ECHR with quasi-constitutional status in other Contracting
States. Id.
119. See id. at 64 (commenting that European Court case law could provide source
of constitutional law for Irish tribunals).
120. IR. CONST. arts. 40-44; see DRZEMCZEWSKu, supra n.16, at 174 (explaining Ire-
land's motive for not incorporating ECHR upon ratification).
121. IR. CONST. art. 40.
122. See id. art. 40.1 (stating that "all citizens shall, as human persons, be held
equal before the law").
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citizens through Irish legislation. 123
Experts recognize that Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 provide a
rich source of unenumerated rights in Irish constitutional law. 124
Following the 1965 watershed case Ryan v. Attorney-General,
125
Irish courts recognized that the Irish Constitution does not ex-
haustively enumerate the rights of Irish citizens. 126 Specifically,
Irish tribunals began to acknowledge two types of rights under
Article 40.3: enumerated and unenumerated. 127  The Irish
courts employed various tests to identify unenumerated rights
under the Irish Constitution, but these tests did not provide an
objective source of unenumerated rights. 121
123. Id. art. 40.3.1. Article 40.3.1 of the Irish Constitution states: "[t]he State
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Id. Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution
provides: "[t]he State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and
property rights of every citizen." Id.
124. See Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. 36, 96 (stating that Articles 4044 of
Irish Constitution contain fundamental rights of all Irish citizens); see also Hogan, supra
n.97, at 97 (emphasizing importance of Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 in Irish constitutional
law); see generally David O'Connor, Limiting "Public Morality "Exceptions to Free Movement in
Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 695, 708
(1997) (canvassing Article 40 issues with respect to right to access abortion information
abroad); S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally Recognized
Human Rights and Minimize the Potential for Violence Within a Society?, 29 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 1, 28, 29 n.132 (1997) (reviewing Article 40 vis-d-vis religion); Amy M. Buckley,
Other International Issues: The Primacy of Democracy Over Natural Law in Irish Abortion Law,
9 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 275, 279, 282 (1999) (relating Articles 40 and 41 to Irish
abortion law and family rights); Hugh O'Flaherty, An Introduction to the Relationship Be-
tween European Community Law and National Law in Ireland, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1151
(1997) (explaining that Articles 40-45 protect fundamental rights); Liam Hamilton,
Matters of Life and Death, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 544-46 (1996) (discussing Articles 40-
43).
125. [1965] I.R. 294 (declaring existence of unenumerated rights under Article
40.3 of Irish Constitution).
126. See Sherlock, supra n.97, at 128 (examining Irish courts' attitude toward
unenumerated rights); see generally Abigail-Mary E.W. Sterling, The European Union and
Abortion Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland's Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 385,
389 (1997) (mentioning unenumerated rights in context of Irish abortion law); Anna
Margaret McDonough, "Wen Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling: Legalizing Divorce in Ireland, 14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 647, 654-55 (1996) (canvassing unenumerated rights vis-d-vis Irish di-
vorce legislation); Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The
Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal
Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 371 n.294 (1996) (addressing unenumerated right to
information in Irish jurisprudence).
127. See Barnes, supra n.97, at 657 (describing specified and unspecified rights).
128. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 101 (positing lack of objective method of identifying
unenumerated rights under Article 40.3.1); see also Report of Constitution Review Group,
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a. Judicial Recognition of Unenumerated Rights
Scholars note that Article 40.3.1-coupled with Article
40.3.2's substantive due process protection of Irish citizens' lives,
persons, and property rights '29-provides the principal source of
unenumerated rights in Irish constitutional jurisprudence. 130
Initially, the Irish courts interpreted Article 40.3 as a proclama-
tion to the Oireachtas to enact legislation protecting the per-
sonal rights of Irish citizens; the Irish courts concluded that this
proclamation did not give the courts the power of judicial re-
view."13 ' Later, the Irish courts changed their non-interventionist
approach to Article 40.3.132 Beginning in 1965, the Irish judici-
ary looked to Article 40.3 to articulate unenumerated rights and
determine whether those rights require legislative protection. 133
After Ryan v. Altorney-General, the Irish judiciary acknowl-
edged that the Irish Constitution does not fully enumerate the
rights of Irish citizens. 134 In particular, Irish courts started to
recognize both enumerated and unenumerated rights under Ar-
supra n.107 (commenting that there seems to be no objective means of identifying
unenumerated rights).
129. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.2.
130. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 97 (describing Article 40.3 as "cornerstone of Irish
constitutional jurisprudence" and mentioning that Article 40.3.2 offers substantive due
process protection); see also JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 314-15
(1992). Article 40.3.1 provides a general guarantee of the personal rights of every Irish
citizen. Id. (discussing how Article 40.3.2 provides protection "in particular" for "the
life, person . . . property rights of every [Irish] citizen." Id.; Ryan v. Attorney-General,
[1965] I.R. 294, 312-13 (finding that because Article 40's other provisions do not specif-
ically uphold Irish citizen's right to life or right to free movement within State, Article
40's other provisions do not contain complete enumeration of guaranteed rights);
CASEY, supra, at 315 (noting that after Ryan, Irish judiciary assumed duty of determining
which unenumerated rights Irish Constitution implicitly protects); see, e.g., Norris v.
Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. 36, 96-97 (following Ryan's interpretation of unenumer-
ated rights).
131. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (explaining that in "modern times," Irish courts
interpreted Article 40.3 as authorizing Oireachtas to articulate personal rights of Irish
citizens). The Ryan court ruled against this assumption and allocated the function of
articulating enumerated rights to the Irish courts. Id.; see also Barnes, supra n.97, at 657
(describing history ofjudicial review in Ireland).
132. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (declaring that Irish courts could now identify
unenumerated rights in Irish Constitution).
133. See Barnes, supra n.97, at 657 (explaining that Irish courts changed their non-
interventionist approach to Article 40.3); see also Sherlock, supra n.97, at 128 (marking
year when Irish courts' attitude toward judicial review changed dramatically).
134. See Sherlock, supra n.97, at 128 (examining Irish courts' attitude toward
unenumerated rights); see generally Sterling, supra n.126, at 389 (discussing unenumer-
ated rights in context of Irish abortion law); McDonough, supra n.126, at 654-55
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ticle 40.3.' In addition, the Irish courts could now invoke
unenumerated rights to invalidate conflicting legislation. 136
Thus, the Irish judiciary began providing protection of the
unenumerated rights implicit in the Irish Constitution.'37
In Ryan, plaintiff Gladys Ryan claimed that Articles 40.3.1
and 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution implicitly provides a right to
bodily integrity. 3 ' Accordingly, she complained that an Irish
water fluoridation law, the Health (Fluoridation of Water Sup-
plies) Act 1960 ("Fluoridation Act"),139 violated this constitu-
tional right.140 She claimed that fluoridation of water supplies
created a health hazard, and, therefore, wanted the Act abol-
ished.14 '
In response to Ryan's claim, the High Court concluded that
the phrase "in particular", found in Article 40.3.2,142 provided
for extensive unenumerated personal rights, which the Irish
Constitution would protect.'43 The court explained that Article
(describing unenumerated rights vis-d-vis Irish divorce legislation); Ball, supra n.126, at
371 n. 294 (addressing unenumerated right to information in Irish jurisprudence).
135. See Barnes, supra n.97, at 657 (describing specified and unspecified rights).
136. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (citing papal letter entitled Pacem in Terris, ad-
dressed to Roman Catholic Church, as source of unenumerated rights).
137. See John A. Quinlan, N., The Right to Life of the Unborn-An Assessment of the
Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, [1984] BYU L. REv. 371, 378 (noting Supreme
Court's constitutional protection of individual unenumerated rights).
138. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (arguing that language of Articles 40.3.1 and
40.3.2 implies unenumerated right to bodily integrity); see also O'Brien, supra n.108, at
589-90 (noting that court agreed with plaintiff Ryan's finding of right to bodily integ-
rity, but found no violation of that right in this case).
139. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 298 (discussing how Health (Fluoridation of Water
Supplies) Act 1960 ("Fluoridation Act") compelled each health authority in Ireland to
add particular percentage of fluoride to water supplies in order to decrease dental dis-
ease among Irish population). In addition, the Health (Fluoridation of Water Sup-
plies) Act 1960 [hereinafter Fluoridation Act] required the health authorities to fluori-
date the water by a certain date to be set by the Minister of Health. Id.
140. See id. at 314 (considering whether Fluoridation Act violated Ryan's right to
bodily integrity); see also Hogan, supra n.97, at 101 (mentioning that Ryan belonged to
association opposing fluoridation of Irish water supplies).
141. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (analyzing Ryan's claim that the fluoridation of
water is dangerous); see also Hogan, supra n.97, at 101 (opining that at outset, Ryan's
chances of committing Irish Supreme Court to radical proposition that fluoridation
invaded bodily integrity must have appeared slim).
142. IR. CoNsT. art. 40.3.2. Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution provides: "[t]he
State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the
case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good flame, and property rights of
every citizen." Id. (emphasis added).
143. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (finding support for unenumerated rights in Arti-
cles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2); see also O'Brien, supra n.108, at 590 (explaining that Ryan court
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40.3.2 refers to rights related to life and noted that Article 40.3.1
does not articulate specific rights. 14 4 The court conceded that
perhaps the Oireachtas should enumerate these rights, but be-
cause the courts had enumerated similar rights at formative
common law, the courts had the power to do so now. 1 45 Accord-
ingly, the Ryan court specified privacy and bodily integrity as
unenumerated rights.'46 Thus, Ryan declared the Irish courts'
ability to enumerate rights under the Irish Constitution and en-
shrined the rights to privacy and bodily integrity as enumerated
rights. '47
b. Identifying Unenumerated Rights
The Irish judiciary used various tests to identify unenumer-
ated rights under the Irish Constitution, but these tests did not
interpreted Article 40.3.2 as indicating intent of Irish Constitution's drafters to enumer-
ate some, but not all, examples of extensive corpus of personal rights which Irish Con-
stitution would protect).
144. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (containing court's analysis of words "in particu-
lar" in Article 40.3.2 of Irish Constitution). The court construed the words "in particu-
lar" in Article 40.3.2 as a detailed statement of something already contained in the
general guarantee of rights in Article 40.3.1. Id. But Article 40.3.2 refers to rights re-
garding life, and Article 40.3.1 specifies no rights regarding life. Id. Consequently, the
court concluded that the general guarantee in Article 40.3.1 extended rights not speci-
fied in Article 40. Id.
145. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313 (explaining that because Irish courts had speci-
fied unenumerated rights at early common law, Irish courts should be able to specify
unenumerated rights now); see also O'Brien, supra n.108, at 590 (examining Ryan
court's reasoning); see generally Strong, supra n.124 (reviewing court's approach in
Ryan); McDonough, supra n. 126 (discussing Ryan); Hamilton, supra n.124 (addressing
Ryan).
146. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313-14 (enshrining rights to bodily integrity and pri-
vacy as constitutionally protected unenumerated rights). The Ryan court found that
fluoridation of water supplies had reduced tooth decay according to various studies,
and particularly, the benefits of fluoridation had been shown in the United States,
which had fluoridated its drinking water for approximately seventeen years before Ryan
was adjudicated. Id. After hearing expert and scientific testimony that the fluoridation
process would benefit the population, the court held that the Fluoridation Act violated
neither the right to privacy nor the right to bodily integrity. Id. The petitioner ap-
pealed to the Irish Supreme Court, which upheld the High Court's theory of
unenumerated rights and affirmed the High Court's holding regarding the Fluorida-
tion Act. Id.; see also Hogan, supra n.97, at 101 (noting that scientific and expert testi-
mony in Ryan showed that fluoridation of water supplies was beneficial, not harmful, to
health).
147. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 313-14 (declaring that rights to privacy and bodily
integrity are constitutionally protected unenumerated rights); see also Hogan, supra n.
97, at 102 (discussing how Ryan court declared that Irish judiciary had power to identify
unenumerated rights).
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provide an objective source of unenumerated rights. 4 8 For ex-
ample, in Ryan, the High Court proposed the following source
of unenumerated rights: the Irish judiciary could find
unenumerated rights in the Christian and democratic nature of
Ireland.' 49 To clarify the first limb of this test, the High Court
relied on a papal letter called Pacem in Terris when it acknowl-
edged the right to bodily integrity in Ryan. 5 ' The relevant por-
tion of Pacem in Terris claims that each person has the right to
life, bodily integrity, food, clothing, shelter, rest, medical care,
and necessary social services.151 Of this list, however, the Irish
judiciary only provided constitutional protection for the right of
bodily integrity.'52
Similarly, the second part of the test, the democratic nature
of Ireland, does not provide an objective means of identifying
unenumerated rights.'58 For instance, the rights associated with
a democratic State include a fair voting system and a representa-
tive government system, but Articles 16 and 28 of the Irish Con-
148. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 102-03 (positing lack of objective method of identify-
ing unenumerated rights under Article 40.3.1); see also Report of the Constitution Review
Group, supra n.107 (agreeing that case law after Ryan has not provided objective way to
identify unenumerated rights).
149. Pacem in Terris (Apr. 11, 1963), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-fa-
ther/johnxxiii/encyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii enc_1 1041963_pacem-en.html, cl.
11. Clause 11 provides: "[m]an has the right to live. He has the right to bodily integ-
rity and to the means necessary for the proper development of life, particularly food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, rest, and, finally, the necessary social services." Id.; see
Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (citing Pacem in Terris as bolstering court's ruling that right to
privacy and right to bodily integrity shall be recognized and protected as unenumer-
ated rights); see also Quinlan, supra n.137, at 378-79 (mentioning Christian and demo-
cratic nature of Ireland as source of unborn baby's unenumerated right to life).
150. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (supporting right to bodily integrity with excerpt
from Pacem in Terris); see also Hogan, supra n.97, at 107 (analyzing reliance on papal
encyclical in Ryan).
151. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (quoting Pacem in Terris); Hogan, supra n.97, at
106 (analyzing Pacem in Terris statement regarding human rights it considered univer-
sal).
152. See Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 314 (finding no violation of plaintiff's right to bodily
integrity). The Ryan court did establish the existence of an unenumerated right to
bodily integrity under Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. Id.; see also Hogan, supra
n.97, at 106 (pointing out that Irish courts do not protect most rights listed in papal
letter). Moreover, the Irish courts did not specify reliance on any particular set of
Christian documents. Id.
153. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 104 (discussing difficulty of applying "democratic
nature of State" test).
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stitution already contain these guarantees.1 54 Other democratic
rights, such as a free press and the right to criticize government
policy, flow from Article 40.6 of the Irish Constitution. 15 5 There-
fore, the second limb of the test does not add any rights that the
Irish Constitution does not already provide, except for the right
to travel. 1
56
Finally, commentators conclude that natural law also does
not provide an objective means of identifying unenumerated
rights under Article 40.3.157 For instance, the Irish Supreme
Court relied on natural law in the 1974 case McGee v. Attorney-
General, but noted the drawbacks of natural law as a source of
unenumerated rights. 51 In McGee, plaintiff McGee underwent
several difficult pregnancies; she almost died during her second
pregnancy.1 59 Her doctor warned her that another pregnancy
could jeopardize her life, so she opted for a diaphragm."" Sub-
sequently, she tried to import additional contraceptives from En-
154. See id. (discussing which rights might arise from democratic nature of Ire-
land); see generally IR. CONST. arts. 16 and 28.
155. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 104 (opining that "democratic nature of Ireland" is
difficult to define). For example, a State which denies its citizens the right to travel
would likely be perceived as oppressive to the point of tyranny, but if the State allowed
free elections and allowed free press, the State could still call itself democratic. Id.; see
generally IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1. Article 40.6.1 of the Irish Constitution states:
The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to
public order and morality: The right of the citizens to express freely their
convictions and opinions. The education of public opinion being, however, a
matter of such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavor to
ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema,
while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, shall not be used to un-
dermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.
Id.
156. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 105 (concluding that right to travel is only right that
Irish Constitution does not explicitly protect that could reasonably arise from demo-
cratic nature of State).
157. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 108 (describing natural law approach adopted in
some Irish cases); see also McGee v. Attorney-General, [1974] I.R. 284, 318-19 (relying
on natural law for its finding of marital privacy); Buckley, supra n.124, at 281 (citing
McGee as example of natural law's role in Irish jurisprudence).
158. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 319 (conceding that natural law's precise definition
is elusive).
159. See id. at 325 (revealing that if McGee were to become pregnant, she would
face considerable risk of death or paralysis); see also Quinlan, supra n.137, at 379 (not-
ing that McGee had four children, two of whom were twins, in three years).
160. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 289 (conveying McGee's decision to use contracep-
tives); see also Quinlan, supra n.137, at 379 (mentioning doctor's advice regarding con-
traceptives).
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gland to supplement the diaphragm, but Irish customs officials
seized the contraceptives under the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1935 which forbade the importation and sale, but not the
use of, contraceptives. 6 '
The Supreme Court ruled that the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act, 1935 violated the unenumerated right to marital pri-
vacy under Article 40.3 and that natural law supported the
Court's finding of the existence of an unenumerated right to
marital privacy. 62 In McGee, the court defined natural law as the
law of God, promulgated by reason and ultimately governing all
the laws of humanity.1 6 The court also noted, however, that nat-
ural law's precise definition and import have eluded theologians
for centuries. 64 Consequently, commentators acknowledge that
natural law, like the "Christian and democratic nature of Ire-
land," does not provide an objective, precise standard that would
ensure consistent case law on enumerated rights. 65
161. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 297 (describing how Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1935 prohibits importation of contraceptives); see also Quinlan, supra n.137, at 379
(commenting that Irish officials confiscated Mrs. McGee's contraceptives).
162. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 284-85 (holding that restriction on importation and
sale of contraceptives violated right to marital privacy under Articles 40.3.1 and 41.1 of
Irish Constitution); see also Quinlan, supra n.137, at 380 (mentioning that conservative
Irish doctors and lawyers feared that McGee would lead to liberalization of Irish abortion
laws); Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. 36, 96 (recalling McGee as "forensic sur-
prise"); see generally Sterling, supra n.] 26, at 406 (addressing liberalization of Irish abor-
tion legislation).
163. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 318 (discussing natural law); see also Hogan, supra
n.97, at 108 (explaining that natural law approach was popular until early 1980s). The
natural law approach is seldom used today, however, because natural law lacks precision
and thus does not provide the objective standard required for consistent constitutional
jurisprudence. Id.; see generally Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity: Insights from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 261, 272-73 (2001) (acknowl-
edging flaws of natural law); Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Makahiki: The Governing Telos of
Peace, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 301, 325-26 (2001) (cataloguing drawbacks of natural law); Bene-
dict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentili's Combination of
Pragmatic Pluralism and NormativeJudgment, 92 AMJ. INT'L L. 713, 716-17 (1998) (men-
tioning flaws of natural law).
164. See McGee, [1974] I.R. at 317-18 (acknowledging vagueness of Justice Walsh's
natural law definition); see also Hogan, supra n.97, at 110 (noting disputed nature and
extent of natural law).
165. See Hogan, supra n.97, at 108 (discussing drawbacks of natural law as means of
identifying unenumerated rights). Natural law is too vague to be a clear, obective
source of unenumerated rights. Id. Nevertheless, case by case, without an objective
test, the Irish courts derived and enshrined several unenumerated rights since Ryan. Id;
see, e.g., The State (M.) v. Minister for Foreign Affairs, [1979] I.R. 73 (deriving
unenumerated right to travel); Attorney-General v. Paperlink Ltd., [1984] I.L.R.M. 338
(enshrining unenumerated right to earn livelihood); Kennedy v. Ireland, [1987] I.R.
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II. FIAING THE PERFECT SWING: ALIGNING IRISH
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITH THE ECHR
Commentators recognize that the Irish judiciary inconsis-
tently construed the ECHR in light of domestic law-i.e., the
Irish courts relied on the ECHR as persuasive legal precedent or
disregarded the ECHR as legal authority. 1 66 At least one expert
maintains that Ireland's enforcement record suggests that the
Irish government provided inconsistent enforcement of Euro-
pean Court judgments regarding public morality.16 7 Even when
the Irish government complies promptly with European Court
decisions, the petitioner may have an uncertain victory.' 6 8
A. The Irish Judiciamy's Inconsistent Application of ECHR Provisions
and European Court Decisions
Scholars recognize that the Irish courts took inconsistent
approaches to interpreting the ECHR as against domestic law.'6 9
553 (establishing unenumerated right to privacy); Murray v. Ireland, [1991] I.L.R.M.
465 (deriving unenumerated right to found family); Murphy v. Greene, [1990] 2 I.R.
566 (enshrining unenumerated right of access to Irish courts); see generally JOHN MAU-
RICE KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992);JOHN MAURICE KELLY,
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE IRISH LAW AND CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1967).
166. See Gleeson, supra n.31, at 259 (commenting that Irish courts made inconsis-
tent and sporadic references to ECHR); see also Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 49 (noting
that Irish courts selectively relied upon ECHR); BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, at
17.16 (mentioning that ECHR has not been incorporated into Irish law, but Irish courts
sometimes invoke ECHR provisions in support of arguments challenging constitutional-
ity of Irish legislation). Nevertheless, because the ECHR is not part of domestic law,
parties to Irish legal proceedings cannot rely on ECHR provisions. Id.
167. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 54 (noting that Irish governments might be
slow to enforce Court decisions concerning conduct considered immoral by Irish gov-
ernment); see, e.g., Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988) (holding that Irish
statute prohibiting certain sexual behavior did not invade applicant's privacy).
168. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 54 (showing how even immediate compli-
ance can result in moot victories, because if European Court witnesses Contracting
State's immediate compliance with European Court decisions regarding ECHR right,
European Court will cease to monitor Contracting State's behavior with respect to that
right). Consequently, the Contracting State may revert to violating that right, and peti-
tioner will be discouraged from bringing suit because the European Court's previous
decision failed to secure consistent compliance. Id.
169. See Gleeson, supra n.31, at 259-60 (describing Irish judiciary's references to
ECHR as sporadic and inconsistent). For instance, the Irish courts have been inconsis-
tent as they have not strictly followed the dualist view of the ECHR, insofar as the Irish
tribunals have sometimes looked to the ECHR for guidance. Id.; see also Dillon-Ma-
lone, supra n.58, at 49 (noting Irish judiciary's inconsistent selective reliance upon
ECHR provisions). In the United Kingdom, which has not incorporated the ECHR,
judicial reliance upon the ECHR is construed as an attempt to incorporate the ECHR
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For example, in Norris v. Attorney-General,170 the petitioner ar-
gued that the Irish Supreme Court should treat the European
Court decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 7 ' which chal-
lenged the same legislation at issue in Norris, as binding author-
ity.17 2 Norris claimed, moreover, that because Ireland ratified
the ECHR, a presumption of conformity exists between Irish do-
mestic law and the ECHR. 1
73
In its holding, the Norris court cited 0 Laighleis to support
the proposition that Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution allows
only dualist incorporation (i.e., incorporation by the Oireach-
tas) .1 74 The Oireachtas did not incorporate the ECHR into Irish
law. Accordingly, the Norris court concluded that no presump-
tion of conformity existed between the ECHR and Irish law.1 71
Indeed, the court claimed that the ECHR did not and could not
affect Irish law in any way. 176
Nevertheless, in State (D.P.P.) v. Walsh,1 7 7 the court stated a
into domestic law "by the back door." Id. at 50; O'Connell, supra n.11, at 84-85 (ex-
plaining that because Ireland follows dualist approach to incorporation, ECHR does
not form part of Irish domestic law). Nevertheless, the Irish judiciary has sporadically
acknowledged the ECHR's significance. Id. at 85.
170. [1984] I.R. 36 (upholding Irish law that prohibited consensual sodomy).
171. 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982) (holding that Irish law that prohibited consen-
sual sodomy violated petitioner's right to privacy under Article 8 of ECHR).
172. See Norris, [1984] I.R. at 66 (containing Norris' argument that Irish tribunals
should treat Dudgeon as more than persuasive authority); see also O'Connell, supra n.10,
at 93 (discussing view which has found little support among Irish courts and scholars).
Under this seldom-supported view, the ECHR can be given indirect effect domestically
when an Irish citizen, acting as a private attorney-general, brings suit to compel the
government to observe generally recognized principles of international law, in accor-
dance with Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution. Id.; see generally IR. CONST. art. 29.3.
Article 29.3 of Irish Constitution states: "Ireland accepts the generally recognized prin-
ciples of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States." Id.
173. See Norris, [1984] I.R. at 66 (rebutting presumption of conformity); see also
O'Connell, supra n.11, at 91 (noting that given presumption of conformity, Irish courts
should query whether Irish laws are consistent with ECHR).
174. See Norris, [1984] I.R. at 69 (explaining that "touchstone of constitutionality"
resides only in Irish Constitution); see also O'Connell, supra n.11, at 91 (positing that
Irish courts consider ECHR provisions when resolving public policy questions, but not
when determining constitutional issues).
175. See Norris, [1984] I.R. at 66 (citing Article 29.3 of Irish Constitution as proof
that Oireachtas alone has power to incorporate ECHR); see also O'Connell, supra n.ll,
at 91 (mentioning that Norris court found no presumption of conformity between Irish
domestic law and ECHR until Oireachtas incorporates ECHR into Irish domestic law).
176. See Norris, [1984] I.R. at 66 (declaring that ECHR has no bearing on questions
arising under Irish Constitution).
177. [1981] I.R. 412.
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presumption that the Irish law regarding contempt of court con-
formed to Articles 5 and 10(2) of the ECHR.'78 These Articles
state the right to liberty, security, and freedom of expression.
1 79
At least one commentator notes that if the courts presumed that
Irish law in particular areas conformed to ECHR standards, the
ECHR would enjoy a higher status in Irish courts than it cur-
rently does amongst most Irish courts. 8 °
Similarly, in O'Leary v. Attorney-General,"1 the High Court re-
lied on Article 6 of the ECHR' 8 2 in discussing universal recogni-
tion of the presumption of the defendant's innocence at trial. 183
Yet when O'Leamy went up to the Irish Supreme Court, the Irish
Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's holding, independent
of the ECHR.184 The court in that case claimed that reference to
the ECHR was unnecessary. 18
5
Likewise, in Heaney v. Ireland,'86 the Irish judiciary treated
the ECHR with skepticism. 18 7 In Heaney, the petitioner claimed
that Section 52 of the Offenses Against the State Act (1939),
which allowed jurors to draw adverse inferences from an accused
person's silence, violated an unenumerated constitutional right
178. See id. at 440 (stating presumption of conformity between ECHR and Irish law
concerning contempt of court); see also Gleeson, supra n.31, at 260 (discussing pre-
sumption of conformity).
179. See ECHR, supra n.8, arts. 5 and 10 (enshrining right to liberty, security, and
freedom of expression).
180. See Gleeson, supra n.31, at 260 (inferring that presumption of conformity
would enhance ECHR status in domestic courts).
181. [1991] 1.L.R.M. 454.
182. See ECHR, supra n.8, art. 6 (providing right to fair trial).
183. See O'Leay, [1991] I.L.R.M. at 461 (containing citation to Article 6 of ECHR);
see also Gleeson, supra n.31, at 260 (exemplifying Irish judiciary's reliance on ECHR);
O'Connell, supra n.l, at 87 (discussing O'Leary).
184. See O'Leary v. Attorney General, [1993] 1 I.R. 102 (referring to ECHR but not
relying on it to find presumption of innocence of defendant at trial).
185. See O'Leary, [1993] 1 I.R. 102 (noting that Irish Constitution predates ECHR
and presumption of innocence at trial can be wholly found in Irish Constitution and
common law); O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 87 (describing how Irish Supreme Court im-
plied that it was needless to refer to ECHR).
186. [1994] 3 I.R. 593.
187. See O'Connell, supra n.l, at 87-88 (citing Heaney ruling as example of euro-
skepticism, or reluctance to rely on European treaties as binding authority, insofar as
Heaney court made no reference to ECHR's guarantee of freedom of expression or
European Court decisions regarding freedom of expression). The ECHR's guarantee
of freedom of expression and European Court decisions regarding this right were rele-
vant to the Heaney court's analysis. Id. Nevertheless, the Heaney court relied instead on
the Irish Constitution's Article 40 guarantee of freedom of expression. Id.
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to silence.' 8 Historically, Irish law recognized a common law
right to silence. 189 Thus, the accused enjoyed a privilege against
self-incrimination during both pre-trial detention and the trial
itself. 9. Before Heaney, however, constitutional scholars de-
tected no support for this right in the Irish Constitution.1 9' Peti-
tioners, therefore, typically had little chance of success when
challenging statutory invasions of the right to silence. 92
Nevertheless, the High Court in Heaney held that Article 38
of the Irish Constitution, which guarantees due process,193 pro-
vides protection for the right to silence.1 94 In reaching this deci-
sion, the High Court in Heaney relied on Article 6 of the
ECHR'95 and the European Court decision in Funke v. France.19 6
188. Offenses Against the State Act, No. 13, 1939 (Ir.); see Heaney, [1994] 3 I.R. at
605-06 (containing Heaney's allegation of violation of right to silence); see also
O'Connell, supra n.l1, at 87 (summarizing facts of case).
189. See O'Connell, supra n.1l, at87 n.20 (tracking Irish law's treatment of right to
silence). The right to silence, in the form of a privilege against self-incrimination dur-
ing trial and pre-trial detention, existed at Irish common law. Id. Until the Heaney
decision in 1994, the Irish judiciary construed the privilege against self-incrimination as
a common law right, not a right for which the Irish Constitution provided protection.
Id. Therefore, Irish plaintiffs can now challenge statutes that violate the right to silence
as unconstitutional. Id.; see generally Ni Aolain, supra n.ll, at 1380-85 (discussing right
to silence at Irish law); see generally Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British Style: A
Decade of Experience with Adverse Inferences from Silence, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 243
(2000) (exploring right to silence in Northern Ireland terrorism prosecutions); Martin
S. Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in Northern Ireland, 27 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995) (addressing restrictions on right to silence in Northern
Ireland); Siobhan M. Keegan, The Criminal Cases Review Commission's Effectiveness in Han-
dling Cases from Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1776, 1795 (1999) (mentioning
restrictions on right to silence in Northern Ireland).
190. See O'Connell, supra n.]1, at 87 n.20 (explaining that following Heaney, Irish
courts viewed privilege against self-incrimination as unenumerated due process right
for which Article 38 of Irish Constitution provides protection); see generally Stacey Car-
rera Friends, An Effective Way to Deal with Terrorism? Britain and Ireland Restrict the Right to
Silence, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 227, 236 n.46 (1999) (citing Heaney in discussion
of right to silence in Ireland).
191. See O'Connell, supra n.1l, at 87 n.20 (noting that after Heaney, Irish plaintiffs
can challenge constitutionality of statutes that curtail right to silence).
192. See id. (inferring unlikelihood of success with such challenges before Heaney).
Even in Heaney, plaintiff lost his specific claim that the statute was unconstitutional. Id.
193. See IR. CONST. art. 38 (ensuring substantive due process for Irish citizens).
194. See Heaney, [1994] 3 I.R. at 610 (upholding Section 52 of challenged act as
constitutionally valid); see also O'Connell, supra n.l 1, at 87-88 (describing Heaney's hold-
ing).
195. See ECHR, supra n.8, art. 6 (conveying right to fair trial).
196. 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 297 (1993) (holding that proportionality test must be ap-
plied to government restrictions on right to silence). This test requires the government
to have a legitimate aim in restricting the right to silence and ensure that the restriction
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Specifically, the High Court in Heaney applied the proportional-
ity test espoused in Funke when deciding whether Section 52 vio-
lated the Irish Constitution's unenumerated right to silence. 197
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's ruling
in Heaney and also applied the Funke proportionality test to Sec-
tion 52.'98 Although the Supreme Court applied the Funke test,
it did not mention the case in its opinion.199
Furthermore, in Finucane v. McMahon,2 °' the Irish Supreme
Court unanimously held that the Irish government could refuse
a request for extradition, if the requesting government was likely
to violate or inadequately protect the suspect's fundamental
rights.2"' As in Heaney, the Finucane court based its decision on a
previous domestic Irish case, Russell v. Fanning,2 2 and ignored
the more recent European Court decision in Soering v. United
Kingdom.203 At least one commentator notes that although Soer-
ing is distinguishable on the facts, its holding would have bol-
stered the Irish Supreme Court's conclusion that the govern-
ment could refuse a request for extradition.20 4
Thus, the Irish judiciary disagreed as to the ECHR's influ-
ence on domestic law. 205 Lower courts in Ireland have relied on
is proportionate to this aim. Id.; see also Heaney, [1994] 3 I.R. at 607 (explaining that
means must be rationally linked to aim; means themselves must be rational and fair;
and means' effects on rights must be proportional to aim).
197. See Funke, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 329 (presenting proportionality test); see also
Heaney, [1994] 3 I.R. at 610 (applying proportionality test); O'Connell, supra n. 11, at
88 (discussing proportionality test's previous application to Irish case); see, e.g., Cox v.
Ireland, [1992] 2 I.R. 503, 511 (applying proportionality test to statutory restriction on
right to earn living after conviction for certain crimes).
198. See O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 88 (describing Supreme Court's euro-
skepticism).
199. See Heaney, [1994] 3 I.R. at 610 (utilizing proportionality test without men-
tioning Funke); see also O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 88 (mentioning how Supreme Court
applied Funke's methodology, yet did not cite to Funke in its opinion). Irish courts
prefer, inter alia, to base their human rights jurisprudence on domestic case law, even
when European Court case law would strengthen their position. Id.
200. [1990] 1 I.R. 165.
201. Id.; see O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 88 (discussing Finucane as further evidence
of Irish judiciary's euro-skepticism).
202. [1988] I.R. 505; see O'Connell, supra n.l, at 88-89 (illustrating Irish Supreme
Court's avoidance of European Court decisions).
203. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (citing ECHR as basis for Contracting States'
refusal to extradite individuals if they would be mistreated in their homeland).
204. See O'Connell, supra n. 11, at 88-89 (commenting that Irish Supreme Court
could have relied on Soering, where ECHR provided basis for refusal of extradition).
Instead, the Irish Supreme Court relied on the Irish Constitution alone. Id.
205. Compare Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36, 66 (holding that ECHR
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the ECHR in human rights decisions and presumed that Irish
law conforms with ECHR provisions.2 °6 On appeal, however, the
Irish Supreme Court often ignores the ECHR on appeal and in-
consistently enforces European Court decisions.20 7
B. Ireland's Failure to Enforce European Court Decisions Concerning
Irish Practices
Ireland's enforcement of three European Court decisions-
Airey v. Ireland ,2° Keegan v. Ireland,20 9 and Norris v. Ireland2 10-
illustrates Ireland's inconsistent enforcement of European Court
judgments. Subsequent Irish legislative acts and cases, such as E.
v. E.211 and WO'R. v. E.H,2 12 provide a basis to determine
whether and to what extent Ireland has enforced Airey, Keegan,
and Norris v. Ireland. Following a European Court judgment, af-
ter a Contracting State modifies the practice or law that violated
petitioner's ECHR rights, the State can continue to regulate that
practice or law within its margin of appreciation, allowing for
legislative, administrative, and judicial discretion with respect to
ECHR provisions. 21"
has no effect on domestic law) with State (D.P.P.) v. Walsh, [19811 I.R. 412, 440 (stating
presumption that Irish law conforms with ECHR); see Whyte, supra n. 1 6, at 858 (inter-
preting Article 29.3 of Irish Constitution, which states that Ireland accepts international
law principles as its rule of conduct, as requiring compliance with ratified international
treaties or conventions before domestic, as well as international, courts).
206. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Attorney General [1991] I.L.R.M. 454 (relying on ECHR
Article 6 to uphold presumption of innocence until proven guilty); Walsh, [1981] I.R. at
440 (claiming that Irish law conforms to ECHR principles).
207. See Heaney v. Ireland, [1994] 3 I.R. 593, 606-10 (applying proportionality
test). The Heaney court did not, however, cite European Court's ruling in Funke, which
contains proportionality test. Id.; see also Finucane, [19901 1 I.R. at 192-93 (refusing
extradition based on Irish judiciary's ruling in Russell). The Finucane court could have
buttressed its reasoning by citing Soering, but did not. Id.; O'Connell, supra n.l, at 88-
89 (analyzing Finucane court's reluctance to refer to Soering); Gleeson, supra n.31, at
259 (concluding that Irish courts have made inconsistent and sporadic references to
ECHR); Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 49 (noting that Irish courts have selectively relied
upon ECHR).
208. 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1961) (holding that Ireland had violated plaintiff's right
to fair trial under Article 6 of ECHR by not granting civil legal aid to plaintiff).
209. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 342 (1994) (recognizing family ties not based on marriage).
210. 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988) (invalidating Irish statute because it interfered
with plaintiffs right to privacy).
211. [1982] I.L.R.M. 497 (denying civil legal aid to impecunious plaintiff).
212. [1996] 2 I.R. 248, 248 (refusing to recognize family ties not based on mar-
riage).
213. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 55 (describing margin of appreciation as
important tool enabling Irish Government to accept need to change domestic law re-
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Commentators note that once the European Court deter-
mines the Contracting State's reforms to be satisfactory, the Eu-
ropean Court is unlikely to enforce the reforms.2 1 4 In addition,
the Contracting State may not enforce the reforms. 215 Accord-
ingly, at least one scholar notes that few petitioners would apply
to the European Court because the prior application had proved
fruitless.2 16
1. The Right to Civil Legal Aid
In Airey v. Ireland, the European Court held that Ireland vio-
lated Airey's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR by
not granting civil legal aid to Airey so she could secure legal rep-
resentation. 21 7 Scholars surmise that the European Court's deci-
sion in Airey caused Ireland to introduce a civil legal aid scheme
in 1980.218 The Irish courts, however, failed to enforce Airey in a
1982 Irish case, E. v. E.
a. The European Court's Decision in Airey v. Ireland
In Airey v. Ireland, the petitioner alleged that Ireland
breached two Articles of the ECHR: Article 6's fair trial guaran-
tee, because her poverty necessitated that she receive legal aid to
secure legal representation and thus obtain a fair trial, and Arti-
cle 8's promise of respect for private and family life.2 2 ° In re-
garding private sexual conduct (Nomis), legal status of illegitimate children (Keegan),
and civil legal aid (Airey)). The margin of appreciation gives Contracting States legisla-
tive, administrative, and judicial discretion with regard to ECHR provisions. Id.
214. See id. (mentioning unlikelihood of European Commission's examination of
whether reformed measures still breach ECHR).
215. See id. (noting possibility that Contracting States might let reform measures
fall into abeyance).
216. See id. (predicting that neglected reform measures could discourage would-be
petitioners from applying to European Court).
217. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318-19 (1979) (concluding that ECHR required
Contracting States to take positive steps to ensure rights protection); see also Connelly,
supra n.8, at 39-40 (commenting on European Court's finding that Article 6 of ECHR
encompassed unenumerated right to civil legal aid).
218. See DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, at 175 (mentioning that Irish Government in-
stituted aid scheme in response to Airey decision); see also BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra
n.14, at 17.11 (noting that Airey judgment led to introduction of Irish legal aid
scheme); Whyte, supra n.16, at 856 (illustrating how Irish citizens could apply to State
Legal Aid Board in order to secure legal representation).
219. [1982] I.L.R.M. 497 (refusing to grant legal aid to impoverished plaintiff).
220. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 305 (explaining that Airey claimed that Irish gov-
ernment violated these rights because, as result of her poverty, she could not get legal
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sponse, the Irish government argued that the petitioner could
have represented herself before the High Court.22' The Euro-
pean Court replied, however, that the ECHR should secure ef-
fective and practical, not illusory and theoretical, rights. 2
22
The European Court also considered whether Airey would
have been capable. of representing herself before the High
Court.223 The European Court concluded that Airey could not
have represented herself effectively. 224 Accordingly, the Euro-
pean Court held that the Irish government violated Airey's rights
under Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR.22 5
Although the Irish government argued that the ECHR
should not extend to social or economic rights, the European
Court did not change its interpretation of the ECHR merely be-
cause it implicated an economic right, civil legal aid.2 2 6 Experts
opine that the Airey court's decision impelled Ireland to intro-
duce a civil legal aid and advice scheme in January 1980.227 This
legal aid and advice scheme went into operation on September
8, 1980, but it proved insufficient, as illustrated by the 1982 case
E. V. E.
representation during herjudicial separation proceedings); see also Connelly, supra n.8,
at 39 (summarizing facts of Airey); ECHR, supra n.8, arts. 6, 8 (providing right to fair
trial and right to respect for private and family life).
221. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 305 (presenting Irish government's argument that
Airey could represent herself and thus enjoyed right of access to court).
222. See id. at 314 (stating European Court's finding that Contracting States must
take positive action to protect individual rights).
223. See id. at 314-15 (analyzing such factors as legal issues and procedure, objectiv-
ity that trial advocacy requires, and fact that all other litigants relied on legal represen-
tation in separation proceedings during past seven years).
224. See id. at 315 (concluding that without legal representation, Airey had no ac-
cess to court); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 39 (explaining European Court's conclu-
sion based on difficulties of self-representation).
225. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318-19 (noting that ECHR required Contracting
States to take positive steps to ensure rights protection); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at
39-40 (describing European Court's holding that Article 6 of ECHR included
unenumerated right to civil legal aid).
226. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 316-17 (pointing out that instituting civil legal aid
scheme was one solution among many to rights violations Airey had suffered); see also
Connelly, supra n.8, at 40 (remarking that European Court willingly interpreted ECHR
so as to enforce economic right).
227. See DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra n.16, at 175 (mentioning that Irish Government in-
stituted aid scheme in response to Airey decision); see also BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra
n.14, at 17.11 (noting that Airey judgment led to introduction of Irish legal aid
scheme); Whyte, supra n.16, at 856 (illustrating how Irish citizens could apply to State
Legal Aid Board for legal aid so that they could secure legal representation).
228. [19821 I.L.R.M. 497 (denying legal aid to indigent plaintiff).
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b. The Irish Court's Failure to Enforce Airey v. Ireland in
E.v.E.
In E. v. E., the defendant argued that Ireland's legal aid
scheme remained in breach of the ECHR's Article 6.229 Initially,
the plaintiff brought the case to secure child custody, alimony,
and child support.21  Prior to the third hearing before the High
Court, the defendant's lawyers withdrew from the case because
the defendant could not pay them for their services.2 "1 Conse-
quently, the defendant applied to the State Legal Aid Board for
legal aid, but the Board rejected his application because he did
not satisfy the means test.2 2 The defendant then appealed to
the Appeal Committee, established under the legal aid and ad-
vice scheme. 233 Five months after the defendant's initial aid ap-
plication, his appeal was still pending.23 4
Thus, the defendant had no legal representation at the
third hearing before the court.235 His legal advisors, however,
229. ECHR, supra n.8, art. 6. Article 6 provides: "[l]n the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law." Id.
230. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 497 (explaining that wife brought action seek-
ing custody of her three children and payments to support herself and her children);
see also Whyte, supra n.16, at 856 (commenting that E. v. E. raised issue of ECHR's
applicability in Irish tribunals); O'Connell, supra n.l 1, at 86 (discussing how plaintiff in
E.v. E. petitioned High Court to apply Airey decision as analogous authority). The
plaintiff argued that the High Court should distinguish the 0 Laighleis principle, be-
cause plaintiff in E. v. E. sought domestic enforcement of a European Courtjudgment
to which Ireland was a party. Id. The E. v. E. court rejected this argument, suggesting
instead that the plaintiff should bring the matter before the European Commission,
and perhaps later seek a determination by the European Court. Id.
231. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (relating how defendant's counsel with-
drew because of defendant's inability to pay them); see also Whyte, supra n.16, at 856
(describing defendant's legal aid travails).
232. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (discussing how defendant's disposable
income exceeded maximum amount at which Legal Aid Board would dispense aid); but
see Whyte, supra n.16, at 856 (deducing that impecunious defendants could fail Legal
Aid Board's income test).
233. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (revealing that defendant appealed); see
also Whyte, supra n.16, at 856.
234. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (explaining that defendant's lawyers con-
tinued case so that his legal right to indemnity by State could be decided); see also
Whyte, supra n. 16, at 856.
235. E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498; see Whyte, supra n.16, at 856-57 (explaining
defendant's position before third hearing).
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agreed to help him adjudicate his right to legal aid 6.2 " They
served notice on the Attorney-General informing him that the
defendant could not afford legal representation for complicated
family proceedings and that he had not received legal aid under
the State scheme. The defendant's legal advisors further in-
formed the Attorney-General that the defendant would apply to
the High Court for an order directing the Irish government to
pay his legal expenses. 237 At the hearing of this application, the
defendant's lawyers relied on the ECHR's Article 6 and the Eu-
ropean Court's Airey ruling.238
The defendant's counsel distinguished 0 Laighleis by claim-
ing that a European Court judgment, if Ireland was a party to
the case, bound Irish courts to the holding.239 The E. v. E. court
rejected this argument.24" The court stated that if the Irish gov-
ernment's response to a European Court decision dissatisfied a
citizen, she should apply to the European Court; thus, the Airey
decision did not safeguard the E. v. E. petitioner's right to legal
aid.'
236. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (describing counsel's agreement to re-
present defendant without pay); see also Whyte, supra n.16, at 857.
237. SeeE. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 498 (conveying that defendant informed Attor-
ney-General of appeal to High Court); see also Whyte, supra n.16, at 857 (discussing
defendant's application to High Court for order requiring State payment of legal
costs).
238. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 499 (revealing that defendant's case relied
heavily on European Court's decision in Airey); see also Whyte, supra n.16, at 857 (nam-
ing defendant's counsel's chief sources for arguing that impecunious defendant had
right to free legal assistance).
239. See E. v. E., [L1982] I.L.R.M. at 499 (expressing defendant's distinguishing of 0
Laighleis through reliance on fact that Ireland was party to Airey); see also Whyte, supra
n.16, at 857 (explaining defendant's counsel's distinguishing of O Laighleis, where court
ruled that ECHR had no effect on Irish law).
240. See E. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 499 (disagreeing with defendant's contention
that European Court's judgment in Airey should bind Ireland); see also Whyte, supra
n.16, at 857 (describing Justice O'Hanlon's reason for rejecting defendant's counsel's
argument as unclear); accord O'Connell, supra n.l, at 86 (agreeing that basis for
judge's decision remained unclear).
241. SeeE. v. E., [1982] I.L.R.M. at 500 (holding that defendant's right to legal aid
was not infringed); but see Whyte, supra n.16, at 856 (opining that Ireland's legal aid
scheme is insufficient because Irish rights claimants who cannot afford legal representa-
tion may fail means test); see also O'Connell, supra n.l, at 86 (recounting judge's rec-
ommendation that citizens dissatisfied with Irish legal aid scheme should apply to Euro-
pean Court, notwithstanding European Court's holding in Airey, which safeguards right
to civil legal aid).
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2. Family Rights
In Keegan v. Ireland, the European Court held that Ireland
had violated an unmarried father's right to a fair trial and right
to respect for family life under Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR.24 2
Thus, the European Court recognized family ties not based on
marriage. 24" Nevertheless, in WO'R. v. E.H., the Irish judiciary
refused to recognize family ties not based on marriage. 244
a. The European Court's Decision in Keegan v. Ireland
Similar to Airey, Keegan v. Ireland, a 1994 European Court
case, received mixed enforcement in Ireland.245 In Keegan, a
mother placed her illegitimate child up for adoption without the
consent or knowledge of the child's natural father.2 46 The fa-
ther protested because he had no standing in the adoption pro-
ceedings. 247 He alleged violations of his right to a fair hearing
under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, his right to respect for family
life under Article 8 of the ECHR, and discrimination against him
as a natural father under Article 14 of the ECHR.24" The Euro-
242. See Keegan v. Ireland, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 342, 365 (1994) (containing Keegan
court's holding); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 42 (mentioning European Court's con-
clusion that because Ireland violated Keegan's right to respect for family life and his
right to a fair hearing, European Court did not reach Keegan's claim of discrimination
against him as natural father).
243. See O'Connell, supra n.l, at 86 (connecting recognition of family ties not
based on marriage to European Court's decision in Keegan). By protecting an unmar-
ried father's rights regarding his child, the European Court also protected family ties
not based on marriage. Id.
244. See W.O'R. v. E.H., [1996] 2 I.R. 248, 270 (opining that Articles 41 and 42 of
Irish Constitution apply only to family ties based on marriage). Indeed, the WO'R v.
E.H. court stated that the Irish Constitution does not recognize de facto family ties. Id.
at 265.
245. See O'Connell, supra n.l, at 86 (explaining that European Court decision in
Keegan granted standing to sue to father of illegitimate child); but see W.O'R. v. E.H.,
[1996] 2 I.R. at 265 (refusing to recognize family ties not based on marriage).
246. See Keegan, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 345 (describing how mother acted without
father's permission or awareness); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 42 (summarizing facts
of Keegan).
247. See Keegan, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 364 (discussing father's lack of standing); see
also Connelly, supra n.8, at 42 (describing father's legal status in Irish law); BYRNE &
MCCUTCHEON, supra n.14, 17.11 (opining that Keegan decision resulted in promulgation
of Adoption (No. 2) Bill 1996, which gave natural fathers right of consultation in adop-
tion situations).
248. See Keegan, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 360, 364-65 (conveying father's allegations); see
also Connelly, supra n.8, at 42 (listing father's claims); ECHR, supra n.8, arts. 6(1), 8, 14
(providing right to fair trial, right to respect for private and family life, and freedom
from discrimination).
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pean Court found violations of his rights under Article 6(1) and
8 of the ECHR and, because of these findings, did not find it
necessary to decide the discrimination claim. 249 ' Thus, the Euro-
pean Court recognized family ties not based on marriage.25
b. The Irish Court's Failure to Enforce Keegan v. Ireland in
W.O'R. v. E.H.
In W.O'R v. E.H., however, the Irish Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Irish Constitution recognized family ties not
based on marriage. 251' The Irish Supreme Court emphasized
that the European Court's decision in Keegan was not part of
Irish domestic law and that Articles 41 and 42 of the Irish Consti-
tution referred only to the family based on marriage.25 2 Thus,
the Irish court did not recognize family ties that were not based
on marriage, despite the European Court's recognition of family
ties not based on marriage in Keegan.253
3. The Right to Privacy
In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court ruled that an Irish
statute prohibiting consensual sodomy violated Norris' right to
privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR.254 Nevertheless, Ireland
did not repeal the statute in question until five years later.255
249. See Keegan, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 365 (explaining why Keegan court did not reach
discrimination issue); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 42 (discussing European Court's
conclusion that because Keegan suffered violations of his right to respect for family life
and his right to fair hearing, it was unnecessary to adjudicate Keegan's claim of discrim-
ination against him as natural father).
250. See O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 86 (linking concept of family ties not based on
marriage to European Court's decision in Keegan). By providing protection for a fa-
ther's rights regarding his illegitimate child, the European Court provided protection
for family ties not based on marriage. Id.
251. W.O'R v. E.H., [1996] 2 I.R. 248, 265 (exploring issue of family ties in ab-
sence of marriage); see O'Connell, supra n.11, at 86 (stating issue before Irish Supreme
Court in WO'R. v. E.H.).
252. See IR. CONST. arts. 40 and 41; see also WO'R. v. E.H., [1996] 2 I.R. at 270
(maintaining that Articles 41 and 42 of Irish Constitution allude only to family ties
based on marriage). Indeed, the WO'R v. E.H. court declared that the Irish Constitu-
tion does not recognize defacto family ties. Id. at 265.
253. See WO'R v. E.H., [1996] 2 I.R. at 265 (holding that unmarried fathers did
not have right to custody of his child); but see Keegan, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 365 (affirming
legal rights of unmarried fathers).
254. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186, 197 (1988) (overturning anti-sod-
omy law); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 40 (reviewing Norris v. Ireland).
255. See Lysaght, supra n.88, at 172 (calling Irish legislature's response to Norris v.
Ireland indefensible); see also Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 54 (surmising that Irish gov-
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Commentators posit that Irish incorporation of the ECHR would
cure such delays and improve enforcement. 256
a. The European Court's Decision in Norris v. Ireland
Commentators opine that the well-known failure of succes-
sive Irish governments to enforce the European Court's ruling in
Norris v. Ireland undermined the ECHR's status in Ireland.2 57
The case began as Norris v. Attorney-General,2 8 where Norris ar-
gued that an Irish law against consensual sodomy was invalid,
based on the European Court's decision in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom,259 which held that a United Kingdom law criminalizing
consensual sodomy was inconsistent with ECHR.26" Norris relied
on a presumption of conformity between Irish law and the
ECHR, because Ireland had ratified the ECHR.261 In its holding,
the Norris court cited the 0 Laighleis principle, which states that
Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution required dualist incorpora-
ernment's failure to enforce Norris v. Ireland undermined ECHR status in Ireland); see
generally John R. Quinn, The Lost Language of the Irishgayimale: Textualization in Ireland's
Law and Literature, 26 COIUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1995) (noting that when
Oireachtas repealed anti-sodomy law, there was little debate).
256. See Lysaght, su/ra n.88, at 173 (opining that incorporation would promote
enforcement); see also Heffernan, suira n.20, at 33 (noting importance of domestic au-
thorities in enforcing ECHR standards). Human rights can be more immediately and
readily enforced in the plaintiffs domestic courts. Id.; Whyte, supra n.16, at 860-61
(contending that as long as ECHR remains unincorporated, complainants are forced to
rely on ECHR enforcement machinery alone). Incorporation would expedite litigation
and heighten enforcement of domestic complaints concerning human rights infringe-
ments. Id.
257. See Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 54 (noting how noncompliance with Norris
inevitably undermined ECHR's status in Ireland); see also Lysaght, supra n.88, at 172-73
(citing Norris holding as example of unnecessarily dilatory and costly enforcement of
ECHR in Ireland); Connelly, supra n.8, at 43, 46 (describing Norris ruling and conclud-
ing that Irish government's procrastination in implementing ECHR human rights stan-
dards does not improve Ireland's reputation in human rights area).
258. [1984] I.R. 36 (holding that Irish law that prohibited consensual sodomy did
not violate petitioner's right to privacy under Irish Constitution).
259. 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1982).
260. See Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. at 66 (containing Norris' argument
based on Dudgeon, where European Court invalidated statute criminalizing consensual
sodomy in Northern Ireland). Norris argued that the Irish judiciary should follow
Dudgeon as a binding precedent. Id. The Norris court rejected this argument, however,
because the ECHR is not incorporated into Irish law. Id.; see also O'Connell, supra n.il,
at 91 (summarizing facts of Norris v. Attorney-General).
261. See Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. at 66 (expressing Norris' contention
that because Ireland ratified ECHR, Ireland's laws should conform to ECHR); see also
O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 91 (relaying counsel's arguments).
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tion of any international treaty before rights claimants could rely
on that treaty in Irish courts.2 62 Afterward, Norris appealed to
the European Court.263
On appeal to the European Court, the European Court de-
cided that Ireland's anti-sodomy law was incompatible with the
ECHR's Article 8 pledge of respect for private life. 264 The Euro-
pean Court required a compelling justification for government
interference with an individual's privacy and found no such justi-
fication in this case.2 65 For instance, the Irish government pro-
vided no evidence to show that lack of enforcement of its anti-
sodomy law had damaged moral standards in Ireland or caused
public demand for more stringent enforcement. 266
b. Ireland's Failure to Enforce Norris v. Ireland
The law which Norris v. Ireland invalidated remained on the
Irish statute books for five years after the European Court de-
nounced it as contrary to the ECHR.267 As a result, ten years
elapsed between the initiation of Norris' lawsuit and the repeal
of the law he successfully challenged.268 Scholars note that Irish
incorporation of the ECHR would help to prevent these delays
and enhance enforcement. 269
262. See Norris v. Attorney-General, [1984] I.R. at 66-67 (explaining that ECHR is
international agreement that lacks force at domestic level until it is incorporated into
Irish domestic law); see also O'Connell, supra n.ll, at 91 (reviewing 0 Laighleis princi-
ple).
263. See Connelly, supra n.8, at 40 (tracing procedural history of Norris v. Ireland).
264. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186, 197 (1988) (invalidating anti-sodomy
law); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 40 (discussing issue before Court in Norris v. Ire-
land).
265. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 198 (explaining justification require-
ment); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 40 (analyzing Court's decision).
266. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 198 (containing no evidence of moral
turpitude resulting from lack of enforcement); see also Connelly, supra n.8, at 40.
267. See Lysaght, supra n.88, at 172 (describing Irish legislature's response to Norris
v. Ireland as indefensible); see also Dillon-Malone, supra n.58, at 54 (opining that Irish
government's failure to enforce Norris v. Ireland undermined ECHR status in Ireland).
268. See Lysaght, supra n.88, at 172-73 (calculating time elapsed between initiation
of proceedings and repeal of legislation).
269. See id. at 173 (explaining that incorporation would lead to better enforce-
ment); see also Heffernan, supra n.20, at 33 (stating that role of domestic authorities in
enforcing ECHR standards is crucial and human rights can be more easily enforced in
complainant's domestic tribunal, subject to system of additional protection offered by
international tribunals); Whyte, supra n.16, at 861 (arguing that so long as ECHR is
unincorporated, complainants must rely on ECHR enforcement machinery). Incorpo-
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C. Suggestions for Incorporating the ECHR into Irish Domestic Law
In 2001, the Oireachtas passed the European Convention
on Human Rights Bill, 2001 ("ECHR Bill"). 210 Oireachtas de-
scribed the ECHR Bill as an act to enable incorporation. 27' The
ECHR Bill suggests that Irish courts should interpret rules of law
as far as possible in accordance with the ECHR, but allows Irish
courts to follow Irish domestic laws that are incompatible with
the ECHR, because the ECHR'is not yet incorporated into Irish
domestic law.2 72 The next step, choosing a method of incorpora-
tion, has sparked considerable debate. 273 Commentators recog-
nize the existence of several methods of incorporating the
ECHR into Irish law: direct incorporation; ordinary legislation;
"a la carte" incorporation; and constitutional incorporation.274
1. Direct Incorporation
Ireland often uses direct incorporation as a means of incor-
porating international treaties into domestic law. 275 Direct in-
corporation reproduces certain obligations, previously assumed
on an international level, at the domestic level.2 7 6 Under this
approach, the Oireachtas would pass a statute stating that a
treaty had become part of the domestic legal order.27 7 In addi-
tion, the statute could amend national law to eliminate incom-
ration would facilitate litigation and enforcement of domestic complaints regarding
human rights violations. Id.
270. European Convention on Human Rights Bill, No. 26, 2001 (Ir.) [hereinafter
ECHR Bill].
271. See id. at 3 (containing tentative presumption of conformity).
272. See id. at 4-6 (providing for interpretation of ECHR, judicial notice of ECHR
provisions, and declarations of incompatibility).
273. See De Rosa, supra n.l (relating how Attorney-General and Minister of Jus-
tice disagreed about method of incorporation two years ago).
274. See id. (noting that Ireland could incorporate ECHR in various ways); see also
Jaconelli, supra n.14, at 20-23 (discussing direct incorporation, incorporation through
ordinary legislation, and constitutional incorporation); O'Connell, supra n.l, at 97
(describing "a la carte" method of incorporation).
275. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 20 (describing direct incorporation as standard
method of incorporation that Ireland frequently used); see generally Eric Stein, Interna-
tional Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitu-
tions?, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 445 n.79 (1994) (mentioning direct incorporation of
international agreements).
276. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 20 (defining direct incorporation).
277. See id. (explaining that direct incorporation entails legislating text of treaty
into domestic law).
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patibility with the treaty.27
At least one scholar notes that the ECHR stands apart, how-
ever, from this standard exercise in treaty incorporation. 79 Un-
like many other treaties, the ECHR establishes the judicial ma-
chinery for a continually evolving case law.28 1) Indeed, the cur-
rent state of ECHR law depends on multiple European Court
rulings.281  Therefore, a statute that merely stated that a treaty
had become part of the domestic legal order would not keep
pace with the European Court's evolving jurisprudence, because
the statute would provide no means of modifying the treaty. 2 2
Accordingly, the Report of the Constitution Review Group
("CRG") did not recommend the direct incorporation option. 283
2. Ordinary Legislation
Under the ordinary legislation approach, the Oireachtas
could pass a statute embodying the exact words of the ECHR or
adapting those words to specific Irish law concepts. 284 Such a
statute would repeal prior inconsistent Irish legislation.28 5 The
statute itself, however, would be vulnerable to repeal by later in-
consistent legislation. 28 6 Also, at least one commentator notes
that a dichotomy would develop between ECHR-derived rights
and the Irish Constitution's protection of fundamental rights;
consequently, the rights would not receive equal recognition in
Irish courts.287
Presumptively, the statute would enable plaintiffs to rely on
278. See id. (mentioning possibility of amendment).
279. See id. at 21 (conveying that static nature of incorporating statute would not
capture current state of European Court case law).
280. See id. (noting evolving nature of case law under ECHR).
281. See id. (noting that ECHR law is based on multiplicity of Strasbourg rulings).
282. See id. (discussing how ECHR, if it was directly incorporated into domestic
legal system, could not keep pace with evolving Strasbourg jurisprudence).
283. See Report of Constitution Review Group, supra n.107 (advising against direct in-
corporation). Instead, the Constitution Review Group [hereinafter CRG] recom-
mended "a la carte" incorporation. Id.; see also O'Connell, supra n.l, at 97 n.63
(describing CRG as comprising fourteen experts from different fields who studied Irish
Constitution and discussed how to incorporate ECHR into Irish law).
284. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 22 (describing ordinary legislation approach).
285. See id. (stating that statute would repeal earlier, inconsistent domestic law).
286. See id. (noting that statute could be overturned by subsequent inconsistent
domestic law).
287. See id. (explaining how divergence would develop between ECHR rights and
Irish Constitution-derived rights).
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the ECHR in any Irish judicial proceedings.288 Conversely, Arti-
cle 34.3.2 of the Irish Constitution gives jurisdiction to the High
Court and the Supreme Court over the question of any law's
constitutional validity. 289 Consequently, while plaintiffs could
plead ECHR rights in any Irish court, rights claimants under the
Irish Constitution would be subject to vindication or defeat
pending appeal to the highest Irish courts.2 9 0
3. "A La Carte" Incorporation
Alternatively, the CRG recommended "a la carte' incorpora-
tion.291 Under this approach, Irish law would incorporate ECHR
rights only where the Irish Constitution did not expressly protect
such rights; where the ECHR offered a higher standard of pro-
tection than the Irish Constitution did for a particular right; or
where the wording of an Irish Constitution clause, protecting a
particular ECHR right, might be improved.292 One scholar
opines that this option, though flexible, would require intensive
analysis of Articles 40-44 of the Irish Constitution, and could give
rise to disagreement over whether the ECHR or the Irish Consti-
tution offered greater protection for a particular right, and
whether a certain constitutional clause needed improvement.
293
4. Constitutional Incorporation
Finally, the Oireachtas could incorporate the ECHR into
288. See id. (commenting that statute would allow rights claimants to rely on ECHR
in Irish judicial proceedings unless statute expressly provided otherwise).
289. IR. CONST. art. 34.3.2; seeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 22 (explaining that rights
claimants can only rely on Articles 4044 in High Court and Supreme Court).
290. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 22 (mentioning that rights claimants under Arti-
cles 40-44 of Irish Constitution would need to await possible vindication pending appeal
to highest courts).
291. See Report of Constitution Review Group, supra n.107 (detailing "a la carte" ap-
proach). The CRG recommended that the Irish judiciary rely on the ECHR in cases
where the Irish Constitution does not specifically protect a right, the ECHR offers
greater protection of a right than does the Irish Constitution, or the phrasing of the
Irish Constitution which protects such a right needs improvement. Id.; see also
O'Connell, supra n.l, at 97 (setting forth "a la carte" approach).
292. See Report ofConstitution Review Group, supra n.107 (reviewing "a la carte' means
of incorporation); see also O'Connell, supra n.11, at 97 (analyzing "a la carte" method of
incorporation).
293. See Report of Constitution Review Group, supra n.107 (noting that "a la carte" in-
corporation requires in-depth analysis of Irish Constitution's fundamental rights provi-
sions); see also O'Connell, supra n.l, at 97 (mentioning need for intense scrutiny of
Articles 40-44 of Irish Constitution under "a la carte" approach).
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the Irish Constitution. 294 This type of incorporation would re-
quire a constitutional amendment under Article 46 of the Irish
Constitution and also a referendum under Article 46.1 of the
Irish Constitution.295 First, Dail Eireann,296 the lower house of
the Oireachtas, would initiate a proposal for amending the Irish
Constitution. After both houses of the Oireachtas passed the bill
and a simple majority of the people voted for the bill, the Presi-
dent would sign the bill, thus passing it into law. 29 7 From 1972
to 1995, the Irish Constitution was amended in this manner ten
298times.
Constitutional incorporation could take two forms.299 The
Oireachtas could establish the ECHR and European Court case
law as superior to the Irish Constitution."' This type of incorpo-
ration would give precedence to the international legal order
over domestic constitutional law °.3 1 Alternatively, the Oireachtas
could incorporate the ECHR into the Irish Constitution and
confer equal status on both. 0 2 Accordingly, judicial review
294. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 23 (discussing constitutional incorporation); see
generally La Pergola & Del Duca, New International Law in National Systems: Community
Law, International Law, and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601-06 (1985)
(describing constitutional incorporation); Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of
Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 293
(1999) (mentioning constitutional incorporation of human rights treaties).
295. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 23 (summarizing logistics of constitutional amend-
ment in Ireland); see also IR. CONST. art. 46.
296. See Sherlock, supra n.97, at 125 (elaborating upon mechanics of constitu-
tional amendment in Ireland). Dail Eirann ("Dail") is the Irish equivalent of Britain's
House of Commons, the lower chamber of Oireachtas. Id.; see also Flynn, supra n.105,
at 178. Saenad is the upper house of the Oireachtas. Id. Dail and Seanad have equal
voice in the passing of legislation. Id.
297. See Sherlock, supra n.97, at 125 (describing how bills become law in Ireland).
298. See id. at 126 (noting that amendments have lowered voting age (1972); ena-
bled Irish accession to European Community (1972); removed provision privileging
Catholic Church above others (1972); protected adoption orders against possible chal-
lenge (1979); allowed widening of representation of higher education institutions in
Senate (1979); inserted provision on unborn's right to life (1983); permitted extension
of voting rights to non-citizens (1984); allowed ratification of Treaty on European
Union (1992); inserted provisions on right to travel and right to information regarding
unborn's right to life (1992); and lifted constitutional ban on divorce (1995)).
299. SeeJaconelli, supra n.14, at 23 (mentioning two possible sub-variations).
300. See id. (commenting that Oireachtas could give European Court judgments
and ECHR provisions supremacy over Irish Constitution).
301. See id. (concluding that such entrenchment would lead to dominance of in-
ternational legal system over Irish constitutional law).
302. See id. (explaining that ECHR could be embodied in Irish Constitution with
same normative status as Irish Constitution).
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would resolve inconsistencies and conflicts between the ECHR
and non-constitutional Irish law.3" 3 As for conflicts between the
ECHR and the Irish Constitution, the last-in-time law, the ECHR
in this case, would prevail, because the ECHR and Irish Constitu-
tion would have the same status.""
III. A HOLE IN ONE: CONSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION
Constitutional incorporation would confer equal status on
the ECHR, its case law, and the Irish Constitution, thus making
the ECHR, as well as European Court judgments based on
ECHR provisions, enforceable in Irish domestic courts.3"5 Con-
sequently, Irish rights claimants under the ECHR would enjoy
the same privileges (i.e., substantive due process and Irish rules
of evidence) as Irish rights claimants under the Irish Constitu-
tion. Finally, even if these claimants faced delay in domestic
courts, they would no longer undergo an additional, average six-
year delay in the European Court.
A. Solving the Problems of the ECHR Regime Through
Constitutional Incorporation
Currently, Irish rights claimants under the ECHR face an
uphill climb. Such claimants must exhaust domestic remedies,
which means lengthy litigation in the Irish courts before a plain-
tiff can even apply to the European Court. 3° 6 Moreover, if the
European Court had previously decided a similar case brought
by a claimant from another country, the Court would reject the
Irish plaintiff's claim although the Court's previous decision
would not bind Ireland." 7 Indeed, the ECHR does not ensure
303. See id. (stating that issues of inconsistency or conflict between ECHR and ordi-
nary Irish law would be subject to judicial review under Art. 34.3.2 of Irish Constitu-
tion).
304. See id. at 22-23 (describing lex posterior principle, giving priority to most re-
cently passed law). For example, if two laws in a single jurisdiction have equal status,
the more recently passed law prevails. Id.
305. See supra n.302 and accompanying text (conveying that Oireachtas may give
equal status to ECHR and Irish Constitution via constitutional incorporation).
306. See sulpra n.'s 61-65 and accompanying text (reviewing exhaustion of remedies
rule).
307. See supra n.57 and accompanying text (explaining that European Court re-
jects applications that are substantially similar to cases European Court previously adju-
dicated).
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enforcement of European Court decisions.3 °8
Even if an Irish plaintiff successfully brings an action in the
European Court, the European Court has no set rules of evi-
dence. °9 In addition, the European Court cannot compel docu-
ment production or witness attendance. 10  These procedural
drawbacks would disadvantage a rights claimant because the
Irish government could introduce virtually any evidence against
her, yet she might be unable to produce incriminating docu-
ments or witnesses.311
Finally, the European Court takes an average of six years to
decide each rights claimant's application.3 12 Thus, the average
rights claimant waits six years for a decision that is moot at worst
and unenforceable at best.313 For example, in the Norris case,
plaintiff waited ten years for satisfaction. 14 This result under-
mined the ECHR's already tenuous status in Ireland.315
Constitutional incorporation would bestow equal status on
the ECHR, its case law, and the Irish Constitution. 1 6 Conse-
quently, Irish rights claimants under the ECHR would enjoy the
same privileges as Irish rights claimants under the Irish Constitu-
tion. These privileges would include substantive due process
under Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution 317 and Irish eviden-
tiary safeguards. '
308. See supra text accompanying n.86 (stating that ECHR contains no provision
ensuring enforcement of European Court decisions).
309. See supra n.75 and accompanying text (commenting that European Court has
no evidentiary rules).
310. See supra n.80 and accompanying text (noting limits on European Court's
powers regarding discovery).
311. See supra n.80 and accompanying text (explaining that Court of Human
Rights cannot compel document production or witnesses' testimony).
312. See supra text accompanying n.69 (noting that European Court takes six years
on average to adjudicate complaints).
313. See Dillon-Malone supra n.58, at 59 and accompanying text (commenting that
lengthy delays often render European Court decisions moot); see also supra n.86 and
accompanying text (mentioning ECHR's lack of enforcement mechanisms).
314. See supra text accompanying n.268 (noting that Norris waited ten years to
obtain relief).
315. See supra n.257 and accompanying text (discussing how Ireland's dilatory en-
forcement of Norris undermined ECHR's status in Ireland).
316. See supra n.302 and accompanying text (mentioning that Oireachtas may be-
stow equal status on ECHR and Irish Constitution).
317. See supra n.129 and accompanying text (noting that Art. 40.3.2 of Irish Consti-
tution provides protection of substantive due process rights).
318. See supra n.75 and accompanying text (explaining that European Court lacks
evidentiary rules).
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Also, Irish rights claimants would no longer need to exhaust
domestic remedies 19 or risk preemption by similar cases in
other countries. 320 Even if these claimants faced delay in domes-
tic courts, they would no longer risk subsequent, additional de-
lay in the European Court. Unlike the European Court, the
Irish courts could make and enforce decisions unhampered by
margins of appreciation. 21 While the European Court could
only recommend that a Contracting State revise its laws or ad-
ministrative practices, 322 the Irish courts could order the Oi-
reachtas to invalidate Irish laws that violated ECHR rights and
award damages to successful rights claimants. Afterward, the
Irish courts could supervise the Oireachtas to ensure compli-
ance. Thus, home remedies would have teeth, especially in light
of the ECHR's equal status with the Irish Constitution-the
highest law of the land.
B. Incorporating the ECHR As an Objective Source of
Unenumerated Rights
In the 1965 case Ryan v. Attorney-General,3 23 the High Court
cited Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution as a basis for recog-
nizing unenumerated rights.3 2 4 In that case and afterward, how-
ever, Irish tribunals have failed to pinpoint a definitive source of
unenumerated rights.3 25  Possible sources have included the
"Christian and democratic nature of Ireland,''3 26 but this source
is vague and subjective.3 27 Natural law, another possible source
319. See supra n.'s 61-65 and accompanying text (stating exhaustion of remedies
rule).
320. See supra n.57 and accompanying text (remarking that European Court ref-
uses to consider cases substantially similar to those it has already decided).
321. See supra n.213 and accompanying text (defining margins of appreciation as
areas of domestic discretion).
322. See supra text accompanying n.82 (noting that Court can only recommend
changes in law).
323. See supra n.134 and accompanying text (mentioning that Ryan initiated new
era in unenumerated rights jurisprudence by establishing that Irish courts could iden-
tify unenumerated rights in Irish Constitution).
324. See supra n.'s 142-43 and accompanying text.
325. See supra n.128 and accompanying text (explaining that Irish judiciary has not
identified objective source of unenumerated rights).
326. See supra n.149 and accompanying text (noting "Christian and democratic
nature of Ireland" as potential source of unenumerated rights).
327. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (remarking that court has not speci-
fied set of Christian documents from which to derive unenumerated rights); see also
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of unenumerated rights, proved difficult to define objectively.32 8
The first limb of the "Christian and democratic nature of
Ireland" test has proven ambiguous and subjective.3 2 9 For exam-
ple, although the relevant portion of the papal letter Pacem in
Terris identified eight rights worth protecting, the Irish judiciary
chose only to protect the right to bodily integrity. 330 Moreover,
the Irish courts have not specified reliance on any particular set
of religious documents.3 3' Finally, this first part of the test would
not have much resonance for non-Christian Irish citizens.
As for the second limb of the test, it has not fared any bet-
392ter. 3 Most rights encompassed by the term "democratic na-
ture" would already flow from guarantees in the Irish Constitu-
tion."' 3 These rights include the right to a fair voting system and
a democratic system of government, as well as freedom of the
press and the right to criticize government policy.3 34 Thus, the
second limb of the test appears to add nothing to sources of
rights in Ireland.
Finally, natural law, another possible source of unenumer-
ated rights, proved difficult to define objectively.335 In McGee,336
the court described natural law as the law of God.33 v The McGee
court noted, however, that natural law's precise definition had
supra n.153 and accompanying text (commenting that democratic nature of Ireland
part of test does not provide objective source of unenumerated rights).
328. See supra text accompanying n.157 (concluding that natural law does not pro-
vide objective source of unenumerated rights).
329. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (explaining that court has not speci-
fied collection of Christian documents from which to derive unenumerated rights).
330. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (discussing how Irish judiciary has
only enforced one right, right to bodily integrity, from list in Pacem in Terris).
331. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (describing lack of standard set of
Christian documents to serve as objective source of unenumerated rights).
332. See supra n.153 and accompanying text (positing that second limb of test,
"democratic nature of Ireland", does not provide objective source of unenumerated
rights).
333. See supra n.154 and accompanying text (noting that democratic rights such as
voting are already contained in Irish Constitution).
334. See supra n.154 and accompanying text (revealing that Irish Constitution al-
ready protects most rights associated with "democratic nature of State").
335. See supra text accompanying n.157 (remarking that natural law does not pro-
vide objective source of unenumerated rights).
336. See McGee supra n.157 (finding protection of marital privacy based on natural
law).
337. See supra text accompanying n.163 (stating McGee court's definition of natu-
ral law).
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eluded theologians for centuries. 33 ' By contrast, the incorpo-
rated ECHR and its attendant European Court case law would
offer an objective source of unenumerated rights that the ECHR
implies and that the European Court has identified and upheld.
For instance, in Airey, the European Court ruled that the
fair trial guarantee, found in Article 6 of the ECHR, included an
unenumerated right to civil legal aid. 39 In Airey, the European
Court also noted that the ECHR should secure effective and
practical rights, not theoretical and illusory ones.340 Similarly, in
Keegan,' 4 the European Court interpreted Article 6's guarantee
of a fair hearing and Article 8's guarantee of respect for family
life to include a natural father's right to be appointed guardian
of his child and to have standing in adoption proceedings. 42
Thus, the European Court's ruling in Keegan recognized
family ties not based on marriage, 43 which the Irish Constitu-
tion does not.3 44 Likewise, the European Court held in Norris v.
Ireland.45 that the Article 8 pledge of respect for family life pro-
tected petitioner's homosexual behavior,3 46 which the Irish Con-
stitution does not, according to the interpretation offered by the
Irish judiciary when it failed to invalidate the anti-sodomy law in
Norris v. Attorney-General."4 7 Finally, by incorporating the ECHR
into the Irish Constitution, Ireland would assume the obligation
to protect all rights enumerated and unenumerated in the
ECHR and accord these rights the same status as Irish constitu-
tional rights. This obligation would prevent the judiciary from
338. See supra n.164 and accompanying text (revealing McGee court's admission
that natural law is difficult to define objectively).
339. See supra n.21 7 and accompanying text (reviewing Airey holding that Article 6
of ECHR contains unenumerated right to civil legal aid).
340. See supra n.222 and accompanying text (noting Airey court's conclusion that
ECHR should protect practical rights, not theoretical ones).
341. See supra n.'s 242-44 and accompanying text (discussing Keegan holding).
342. See supra n.'s 242-50 and accompanying text (elucidating Keegan ruling).
343. See supra n.'s 242-44 and accompanying text (revealing Keegan decision).
344. See supra n.244 and accompanying text (containing Irish Supreme Court's
statement that Irish Constitution does not recognize family ties not based on marriage).
345. See supra n.'s 258, 260-62 and accompanying text (describing Irish ruling in
Noris v. Attorney-General, which found that Irish statute did not invade Norris' privacy
under Irish Constitution). The European Court held in Norris v. Ireland, however, that
Ireland's statute violated Norris' right to privacy under Article 8 of ECHR. Id.
346. See supra n.'s 258, 260-62, 264-66 and accompanying text (presenting Norris v.
Attorney-General ruling).
347. See supra n.'s 258, 260-61 and accompanying text (summarizing holding in
Norris v. Attorney-General).
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selectively enforcing unenumerated rights, as when the High
Court recognized the right to bodily integrity and disregarded
the other rights listed in Pacem in Terris.34 8
C. Ensuring Fundamental Human Rights Through Judicial Review
Since 1965, the Irish tribunals have frequently exercised
their power of judicial review. 4 9 In the Ryan case that year, the
High Court demonstrated that the judiciary could identify
unenumerated rights.3 50 Previously, such identification was con-
sidered a legislative power.3 5' After Ryan's expansion ofjudicial
power, Irish courts could invoke unenumerated rights in the
Irish Constitution to invalidate conflicting legislation. 52 Thus,
the Irish tribunals could now protect unenumerated rights in
the Irish Constitution.35 The unenumerated rights in the Irish
Constitution, however, need improvement.
For example, in Airey, an impoverished plaintiff vindicated
her unenumerated right to civil legal aid under the ECHR, not
the Irish Constitution.354 Similarly, in Keegan, the European
Court recognized family ties not based on marriage, while the
Irish Constitution did not. 55 Finally, in Norris, the European
Court protected a homosexual man's right to privacy,156 while
the Irish Constitution did not.3 57 Thus, the European Court has
348. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (discussing how Irish judiciary only
enforced one right from list in Pacem in Terris).
349. See supra n.109 and accompanying text (explaining concept ofjudicial review
and its role in Irish jurisprudence).
350. See supra n.147 and accompanying text (describing how Ryan increased Irish
judicial power by establishing Irish judiciary's right to identify unenumerated rights in
Irish Constitution).
351. See supra n.131 and accompanying text (noting how Irish courts previously
left identification of enumerated rights to Oireachtas).
352. See supra text accompanying n.136 (observing how Irish judiciary has been
able to invoke unenumerated rights to invalidate conflicting legislation since 1965 Ryan
case).
353. See supra text accompanying n.137 (explaining how Irish judiciary gained
power after Ryan to provide protection of unenumerated rights in Irish Constitution).
354. See supra n.225 and accompanying text (revealing that Airey holding was based
on ECHR).
355. See supra n.249 and accompanying text (showing that Keegan holding was
predicated on ECHR, not on Irish Constitution).
356. See supra n.'s 262-64 and accompanying text (contrasting Norris v. Attorney-
General holding, which was based on Irish Constitution, with Norris v. Ireland holding,
which was based on ECHR).
357. See id. (discussing Norris decision).
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used the ECHR as an instrument of social change, which the
Irish judiciary has often resisted.
Moreover, Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution requires
that all citizens be treated equally before the law. 358 This clause
would seem to forbid discrimination against poor people, illegiti-
mate children, and homosexuals. Nevertheless, the Irish judici-
ary failed to apply this clause in Airey,359 Keegan,36° and Noris.3 6 '
The incorporated ECHR and its case law, however, would bolster
the Irish Constitution's equal protection clause. Indeed, plain-
tiffs in Airey, 6 2 Keegan,363 and No-is364 vindicated their rights
under the ECHR, though not under the Irish Constitution.
Significantly, after incorporation into the Irish Constitution,
the ECHR would prevail in a conflict between the two, under the
last-in-time rule. 6 6 Thus, the Irish courts could no longer ig-
nore the ECHR's protection of poor people, illegitimate chil-
dren, and other groups who had suffered discrimination under
the Irish Constitution. Finally, the Irish judiciary would have to
invalidate any future discriminatory legislation as incompatible
with the ECHR, just as the judiciary would invalidate legislation
that conflicts with the Irish Constitution. 6 7
CONCLUSION
Constitutional incorporation of the ECHR would solve sev-
eral serious problems. First, constitutional incorporation would
decrease the current burden on Irish rights claimants, by giving
such claimants a domestic forum where they could vindicate
their rights in less time than the average six-year sojourn to Stras-
358. See supra n.122 and accompanying text (presenting text of Article 40.1 of Irish
Constitution).
359. See supra n.225 and accompanying text (articulating Airey holding).
360. See supra n.249 and accompanying text (summarizing Keegan decision).
361. See supra n.'s 262-64 and accompanying text (reviewing Norris judgment).
362. See supra n.225 and accompanying text (elucidating Airey ruling).
363. See supra n.249 and accompanying text (stating Keegan holding).
364. See supra n.'s 262-64 and accompanying text (describing Norris ruling).
365. See supra n.'s 225, 249, 262-64, and accompanying text (demonstrating that
plaintiffs in Airey, Keegan, and Norris triumphed under ECHR, not Irish Constitution).
366. See supra n.304 and accompanying text (describing last-in-time rule).
367. See supra text accompanying n.136 (revealing that Irish judiciary can invali-
date domestic legislation that conflicts with unenumerated rights in the Irish Constitu-
tion).
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bourg, "68 as well as enforce the court's decisions. Second, consti-
tutional incorporation would confer equal status on the Irish
Constitution (the highest law of the land) and the ECHR, thus
signaling the importance of human rights in the Irish regime.
Third, constitutional incorporation would offer an objective
source of unenumerated rights for the Irish judiciary: the ECHR
and European Court case law. Also, the ECHR and its case law
would reinforce the unenumerated rights in the Irish Constitu-
tion and serve as an instrument for social change. Thus, Ireland
could become an important speaker in the dialogue between Eu-
ropean courts and the European Court,3 69 in which the ECHR
reaches its fullest potential as a creator and protector of human
rights in Europe and the world.
368. See supra n.69 and accompanying text (estimating that on average, Strasbourg
proceedings take six years).
369. See supra n.'s 116-19 and accompanying text (concluding that Ireland is ab-
sent from continually evolving dialogue between European tribunals and European
Court so long as Ireland does not incorporate ECHR).
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